Even in the
exercise of the executive power, properly so called—the point upon which his
position seems to be most analogous to that of the King of France—the President
labors under several causes of inferiority. The authority of the King, in
France, has, in the first place, the advantage of duration over that of the
President, and durability is one of the chief elements of strength; nothing is
either loved or feared but what is likely to endure. The President of the
United States is a magistrate elected for four years; the King, in France, is
an hereditary sovereign. In the exercise of the executive power the President
of the United States is constantly subject to a jealous scrutiny. He may make,
but he cannot conclude, a treaty; he may designate, but he cannot appoint, a
public officer. *q The King of France is absolute within the limits of his
authority. The President of the United States is responsible for his actions;
but the person of the King is declared inviolable by the French Charter. *r
q [ The Constitution had left it doubtful whether the President was obliged
to consult the Senate in the removal as well as in the appointment of Federal
officers. "The Federalist" (No. 77) seemed to establish the
affirmative; but in 1789 Congress formally decided that, as the President was
responsible for his actions, he ought not to be forced to employ agents who had
forfeited his esteem. See Kent's "Commentaries", vol. i. p. 289.]
r [ [This comparison applied to the Constitutional King of France and to
the powers he held under the Charter of 1830, till the overthrow of the monarchy
in 1848.—Translator's Note.]]
Nevertheless,
the supremacy of public opinion is no less above the head of the one than of
the other. This power is less definite, less evident, and less sanctioned by
the laws in France than in America, but in fact it exists. In America, it acts
by elections and decrees; in France it proceeds by revolutions; but
notwithstanding the different constitutions of these two countries, public
opinion is the predominant authority in both of them. The fundamental principle
of legislation—a principle essentially republican—is the same in both
countries, although its consequences may be different, and its results more or
less extensive. Whence I am led to conclude that France with its King is nearer
akin to a republic than the Union with its President is to a monarchy.
In what I have
been saying I have only touched upon the main points of distinction; and if I
could have entered into details, the contrast would have been rendered still
more striking. I have remarked that the authority of the President in the
United States is only exercised within the limits of a partial sovereignty,
whilst that of the King in France is undivided. I might have gone on to show
that the power of the King's government in France exceeds its natural limits,
however extensive they may be, and penetrates in a thousand different ways into
the administration of private interests. Amongst the examples of this influence
may be quoted that which results from the great number of public functionaries,
who all derive their appointments from the Government. This number now exceeds
all previous limits; it amounts to 138,000 *s nominations, each of which may be
considered as an element of power. The President of the United States has not
the exclusive right of making any public appointments, and their whole number
scarcely exceeds 12,000. *t
s [ The sums annually paid by the State to these officers amount to
200,000,000 fr. ($40,000,000).]
t [ This number is extracted from the "National Calendar" for
1833. The "National Calendar" is an American almanac which contains
the names of all the Federal officers. It results from this comparison that the
King of France has eleven times as many places at his disposal as the
President, although the population of France is not much more than double that
of the Union.
[I have not
the means of ascertaining the number of appointments now at the disposal of the
President of the United States, but his patronage and the abuse of it have
largely increased since 1833.—Translator's Note, 1875.]]
Accidental
Causes Which May Increase The Influence Of The Executive Government
External
security of the Union—Army of six thousand men—Few ships—The President has no
opportunity of exercising his great prerogatives—In the prerogatives he
exercises he is weak.
If the
executive government is feebler in America than in France, the cause is more
attributable to the circumstances than to the laws of the country.
It is chiefly
in its foreign relations that the executive power of a nation is called upon to
exert its skill and its vigor. If the existence of the Union were perpetually
threatened, and if its chief interests were in daily connection with those of
other powerful nations, the executive government would assume an increased
importance in proportion to the measures expected of it, and those which it
would carry into effect. The President of the United States is the
commander-in-chief of the army, but of an army composed of only six thousand
men; he commands the fleet, but the fleet reckons but few sail; he conducts the
foreign relations of the Union, but the United States are a nation without
neighbors. Separated from the rest of the world by the ocean, and too weak as
yet to aim at the dominion of the seas, they have no enemies, and their interests
rarely come into contact with those of any other nation of the globe.
The practical
part of a Government must not be judged by the theory of its constitution. The
President of the United States is in the possession of almost royal
prerogatives, which he has no opportunity of exercising; and those privileges
which he can at present use are very circumscribed. The laws allow him to
possess a degree of influence which circumstances do not permit him to employ.
On the other
hand, the great strength of the royal prerogative in France arises from
circumstances far more than from the laws. There the executive government is
constantly struggling against prodigious obstacles, and exerting all its
energies to repress them; so that it increases by the extent of its achievements,
and by the importance of the events it controls, without modifying its
constitution. If the laws had made it as feeble and as circumscribed as it is
in the Union, its influence would very soon become still more preponderant.
Why The
President Of The United States Does Not Require The Majority Of The Two Houses
In Order To Carry On The Government It is an established axiom in Europe that a
constitutional King cannot persevere in a system of government which is opposed
by the two other branches of the legislature. But several Presidents of the
United States have been known to lose the majority in the legislative body
without being obliged to abandon the supreme power, and without inflicting a
serious evil upon society. I have heard this fact quoted as an instance of the
independence and the power of the executive government in America: a moment's
reflection will convince us, on the contrary, that it is a proof of its extreme
weakness.
A King in
Europe requires the support of the legislature to enable him to perform the
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution, because those duties are enormous.
A constitutional King in Europe is not merely the executor of the law, but the
execution of its provisions devolves so completely upon him that he has the
power of paralyzing its influence if it opposes his designs. He requires the
assistance of the legislative assemblies to make the law, but those assemblies
stand in need of his aid to execute it: these two authorities cannot subsist
without each other, and the mechanism of government is stopped as soon as they
are at variance.
In America the
President cannot prevent any law from being passed, nor can he evade the
obligation of enforcing it. His sincere and zealous co-operation is no doubt
useful, but it is not indispensable, in the carrying on of public affairs. All
his important acts are directly or indirectly submitted to the legislature, and
of his own free authority he can do but little. It is therefore his weakness,
and not his power, which enables him to remain in opposition to Congress. In
Europe, harmony must reign between the Crown and the other branches of the
legislature, because a collision between them may prove serious; in America,
this harmony is not indispensable, because such a collision is impossible.
Election Of
The President
Dangers of the
elective system increase in proportion to the extent of the prerogative—This
system possible in America because no powerful executive authority is
required—What circumstances are favorable to the elective system—Why the
election of the President does not cause a deviation from the principles of the
Government—Influence of the election of the President on secondary
functionaries.
The dangers of
the system of election applied to the head of the executive government of a
great people have been sufficiently exemplified by experience and by history,
and the remarks I am about to make refer to America alone. These dangers may be
more or less formidable in proportion to the place which the executive power occupies,
and to the importance it possesses in the State; and they may vary according to
the mode of election and the circumstances in which the electors are placed.
The most weighty argument against the election of a chief magistrate is, that
it offers so splendid a lure to private ambition, and is so apt to inflame men
in the pursuit of power, that when legitimate means are wanting force may not
unfrequently seize what right denied.
It is clear
that the greater the privileges of the executive authority are, the greater is
the temptation; the more the ambition of the candidates is excited, the more
warmly are their interests espoused by a throng of partisans who hope to share
the power when their patron has won the prize. The dangers of the elective system
increase, therefore, in the exact ratio of the influence exercised by the
executive power in the affairs of State. The revolutions of Poland were not
solely attributable to the elective system in general, but to the fact that the
elected monarch was the sovereign of a powerful kingdom. Before we can discuss
the absolute advantages of the elective system we must make preliminary
inquiries as to whether the geographical position, the laws, the habits, the
manners, and the opinions of the people amongst whom it is to be introduced
will admit of the establishment of a weak and dependent executive government;
for to attempt to render the representative of the State a powerful sovereign,
and at the same time elective, is, in my opinion, to entertain two incompatible
designs. To reduce hereditary royalty to the condition of an elective
authority, the only means that I am acquainted with are to circumscribe its
sphere of action beforehand, gradually to diminish its prerogatives, and to
accustom the people to live without its protection. Nothing, however, is
further from the designs of the republicans of Europe than this course: as many
of them owe their hatred of tyranny to the sufferings which they have
personally undergone, it is oppression, and not the extent of the executive
power, which excites their hostility, and they attack the former without
perceiving how nearly it is connected with the latter.
Hitherto no
citizen has shown any disposition to expose his honor and his life in order to
become the President of the United States; because the power of that office is
temporary, limited, and subordinate. The prize of fortune must be great to
encourage adventurers in so desperate a game. No candidate has as yet been able
to arouse the dangerous enthusiasm or the passionate sympathies of the people
in his favor, for the very simple reason that when he is at the head of the
Government he has but little power, but little wealth, and but little glory to
share amongst his friends; and his influence in the State is too small for the
success or the ruin of a faction to depend upon the elevation of an individual
to power.
The great
advantage of hereditary monarchies is, that as the private interest of a family
is always intimately connected with the interests of the State, the executive
government is never suspended for a single instant; and if the affairs of a
monarchy are not better conducted than those of a republic, at least there is
always some one to conduct them, well or ill, according to his capacity. In
elective States, on the contrary, the wheels of government cease to act, as it
were, of their own accord at the approach of an election, and even for some
time previous to that event. The laws may indeed accelerate the operation of
the election, which may be conducted with such simplicity and rapidity that the
seat of power will never be left vacant; but, notwithstanding these
precautions, a break necessarily occurs in the minds of the people.
At the
approach of an election the head of the executive government is wholly occupied
by the coming struggle; his future plans are doubtful; he can undertake nothing
new, and the he will only prosecute with indifference those designs which
another will perhaps terminate. "I am so near the time of my retirement
from office," said President Jefferson on the 21st of January, 1809 (six
weeks before the election), "that I feel no passion, I take no part, I
express no sentiment. It appears to me just to leave to my successor the
commencement of those measures which he will have to prosecute, and for which
he will be responsible."
On the other
hand, the eyes of the nation are centred on a single point; all are watching
the gradual birth of so important an event. The wider the influence of the
executive power extends, the greater and the more necessary is its constant
action, the more fatal is the term of suspense; and a nation which is
accustomed to the government, or, still more, one used to the administrative
protection of a powerful executive authority would be infallibly convulsed by
an election of this kind. In the United States the action of the Government may
be slackened with impunity, because it is always weak and circumscribed. *u
u [ [This, however, may be a great danger. The period during which Mr.
Buchanan retained office, after the election of Mr. Lincoln, from November,
1860, to March, 1861, was that which enabled the seceding States of the South
to complete their preparations for the Civil War, and the Executive Government
was paralyzed. No greater evil could befall a nation.—Translator's Note.]]
One of the
principal vices of the elective system is that it always introduces a certain
degree of instability into the internal and external policy of the State. But
this disadvantage is less sensibly felt if the share of power vested in the
elected magistrate is small. In Rome the principles of the Government underwent
no variation, although the Consuls were changed every year, because the Senate,
which was an hereditary assembly, possessed the directing authority. If the
elective system were adopted in Europe, the condition of most of the
monarchical States would be changed at every new election. In America the
President exercises a certain influence on State affairs, but he does not
conduct them; the preponderating power is vested in the representatives of the
whole nation. The political maxims of the country depend therefore on the mass
of the people, not on the President alone; and consequently in America the
elective system has no very prejudicial influence on the fixed principles of
the Government. But the want of fixed principles is an evil so inherent in the
elective system that it is still extremely perceptible in the narrow sphere to
which the authority of the President extends.
The Americans
have admitted that the head of the executive power, who has to bear the whole
responsibility of the duties he is called upon to fulfil, ought to be empowered
to choose his own agents, and to remove them at pleasure: the legislative
bodies watch the conduct of the President more than they direct it. The
consequence of this arrangement is, that at every new election the fate of all
the Federal public officers is in suspense. Mr. Quincy Adams, on his entry into
office, discharged the majority of the individuals who had been appointed by his
predecessor: and I am not aware that General Jackson allowed a single removable
functionary employed in the Federal service to retain his place beyond the
first year which succeeded his election. It is sometimes made a subject of
complaint that in the constitutional monarchies of Europe the fate of the
humbler servants of an Administration depends upon that of the Ministers. But
in elective Governments this evil is far greater. In a constitutional monarchy
successive ministries are rapidly formed; but as the principal representative
of the executive power does not change, the spirit of innovation is kept within
bounds; the changes which take place are in the details rather than in the
principles of the administrative system; but to substitute one system for
another, as is done in America every four years, by law, is to cause a sort of
revolution. As to the misfortunes which may fall upon individuals in
consequence of this state of things, it must be allowed that the uncertain
situation of the public officers is less fraught with evil consequences in
America than elsewhere. It is so easy to acquire an independent position in the
United States that the public officer who loses his place may be deprived of
the comforts of life, but not of the means of subsistence.
I remarked at
the beginning of this chapter that the dangers of the elective system applied
to the head of the State are augmented or decreased by the peculiar
circumstances of the people which adopts it. However the functions of the
executive power may be restricted, it must always exercise a great influence
upon the foreign policy of the country, for a negotiation cannot be opened or
successfully carried on otherwise than by a single agent. The more precarious
and the more perilous the position of a people becomes, the more absolute is
the want of a fixed and consistent external policy, and the more dangerous does
the elective system of the Chief Magistrate become. The policy of the Americans
in relation to the whole world is exceedingly simple; for it may almost be said
that no country stands in need of them, nor do they require the co-operation of
any other people. Their independence is never threatened. In their present
condition, therefore, the functions of the executive power are no less limited
by circumstances than by the laws; and the President may frequently change his
line of policy without involving the State in difficulty or destruction.
Whatever the
prerogatives of the executive power may be, the period which immediately
precedes an election and the moment of its duration must always be considered
as a national crisis, which is perilous in proportion to the internal
embarrassments and the external dangers of the country. Few of the nations of
Europe could escape the calamities of anarchy or of conquest every time they
might have to elect a new sovereign. In America society is so constituted that
it can stand without assistance upon its own basis; nothing is to be feared
from the pressure of external dangers, and the election of the President is a
cause of agitation, but not of ruin.
Mode Of
Election
Skill of the
American legislators shown in the mode of election adopted by them—Creation of
a special electoral body—Separate votes of these electors—Case in which the
House of Representatives is called upon to choose the President—Results of the
twelve elections which have taken place since the Constitution has been
established.
Besides the
dangers which are inherent in the system, many other difficulties may arise
from the mode of election, which may be obviated by the precaution of the
legislator. When a people met in arms on some public spot to choose its head,
it was exposed to all the chances of civil war resulting from so martial a mode
of proceeding, besides the dangers of the elective system in itself. The Polish
laws, which subjected the election of the sovereign to the veto of a single
individual, suggested the murder of that individual or prepared the way to
anarchy.
In the
examination of the institutions and the political as well as social condition
of the United States, we are struck by the admirable harmony of the gifts of
fortune and the efforts of man. The nation possessed two of the main causes of
internal peace; it was a new country, but it was inhabited by a people grown old
in the exercise of freedom. America had no hostile neighbors to dread; and the
American legislators, profiting by these favorable circumstances, created a
weak and subordinate executive power which could without danger be made
elective.
It then only
remained for them to choose the least dangerous of the various modes of
election; and the rules which they laid down upon this point admirably
correspond to the securities which the physical and political constitution of
the country already afforded. Their object was to find the mode of election
which would best express the choice of the people with the least possible
excitement and suspense. It was admitted in the first place that the simple
majority should be decisive; but the difficulty was to obtain this majority
without an interval of delay which it was most important to avoid. It rarely
happens that an individual can at once collect the majority of the suffrages of
a great people; and this difficulty is enhanced in a republic of confederate
States, where local influences are apt to preponderate. The means by which it
was proposed to obviate this second obstacle was to delegate the electoral
powers of the nation to a body of representatives. This mode of election
rendered a majority more probable; for the fewer the electors are, the greater
is the chance of their coming to a final decision. It also offered an
additional probability of a judicious choice. It then remained to be decided
whether this right of election was to be entrusted to a legislative body, the
habitual representative assembly of the nation, or whether an electoral
assembly should be formed for the express purpose of proceeding to the
nomination of a President. The Americans chose the latter alternative, from a
belief that the individuals who were returned to make the laws were incompetent
to represent the wishes of the nation in the election of its chief magistrate;
and that, as they are chosen for more than a year, the constituency they
represent might have changed its opinion in that time. It was thought that if
the legislature was empowered to elect the head of the executive power, its
members would, for some time before the election, be exposed to the manoeuvres
of corruption and the tricks of intrigue; whereas the special electors would, like
a jury, remain mixed up with the crowd till the day of action, when they would
appear for the sole purpose of giving their votes.
It was
therefore established that every State should name a certain number of
electors, *v who in their turn should elect the President; and as it had been
observed that the assemblies to which the choice of a chief magistrate had been
entrusted in elective countries inevitably became the centres of passion and of
cabal; that they sometimes usurped an authority which did not belong to them;
and that their proceedings, or the uncertainty which resulted from them, were
sometimes prolonged so much as to endanger the welfare of the State, it was
determined that the electors should all vote upon the same day, without being
convoked to the same place. *w This double election rendered a majority
probable, though not certain; for it was possible that as many differences
might exist between the electors as between their constituents. In this case it
was necessary to have recourse to one of three measures; either to appoint new
electors, or to consult a second time those already appointed, or to defer the
election to another authority. The first two of these alternatives,
independently of the uncertainty of their results, were likely to delay the
final decision, and to perpetuate an agitation which must always be accompanied
with danger. The third expedient was therefore adopted, and it was agreed that
the votes should be transmitted sealed to the President of the Senate, and that
they should be opened and counted in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives. If none of the candidates has a majority, the House of
Representatives then proceeds immediately to elect a President, but with the
condition that it must fix upon one of the three candidates who have the
highest numbers. *x
v [ As many as it sends members to Congress. The number of electors at the
election of 1833 was 288. (See "The National Calendar," 1833.)]
w [ The electors of the same State assemble, but they transmit to the
central government the list of their individual votes, and not the mere result
of the vote of the majority.] [Footnote x: In this case it is the majority of
the States, and not the majority of the members, which decides the question; so
that New York has not more influence in the debate than Rhode Island. Thus the
citizens of the Union are first consulted as members of one and the same
community; and, if they cannot agree, recourse is had to the division of the
States, each of which has a separate and independent vote. This is one of the
singularities of the Federal Constitution which can only be explained by the
jar of conflicting interests.]
Thus it is
only in case of an event which cannot often happen, and which can never be
foreseen, that the election is entrusted to the ordinary representatives of the
nation; and even then they are obliged to choose a citizen who has already been
designated by a powerful minority of the special electors. It is by this happy
expedient that the respect which is due to the popular voice is combined with
the utmost celerity of execution and those precautions which the peace of the
country demands. But the decision of the question by the House of
Representatives does not necessarily offer an immediate solution of the
difficulty, for the majority of that assembly may still be doubtful, and in
this case the Constitution prescribes no remedy. Nevertheless, by restricting
the number of candidates to three, and by referring the matter to the judgment
of an enlightened public body, it has smoothed all the obstacles *y which are
not inherent in the elective system.
y [ Jefferson, in 1801, was not elected until the thirty-sixth time of
balloting.]
In the
forty-four years which have elapsed since the promulgation of the Federal
Constitution the United States have twelve times chosen a President. Ten of
these elections took place simultaneously by the votes of the special electors
in the different States. The House of Representatives has only twice exercised
its conditional privilege of deciding in cases of uncertainty; the first time
was at the election of Mr. Jefferson in 1801; the second was in 1825, when Mr.
Quincy Adams was named. *z
z [ [General Grant is now (1874) the eighteenth President of the United
States.]]
Crises Of The
Election
The Election
may be considered as a national crisis—Why?—Passions of the people—Anxiety of
the President—Calm which succeeds the agitation of the election.
I have shown
what the circumstances are which favored the adoption of the elective system in
the United States, and what precautions were taken by the legislators to
obviate its dangers. The Americans are habitually accustomed to all kinds of
elections, and they know by experience the utmost degree of excitement which is
compatible with security. The vast extent of the country and the dissemination
of the inhabitants render a collision between parties less probable and less
dangerous there than elsewhere. The political circumstances under which the
elections have hitherto been carried on have presented no real embarrassments
to the nation.
Nevertheless,
the epoch of the election of a President of the United States may be considered
as a crisis in the affairs of the nation. The influence which he exercises on
public business is no doubt feeble and indirect; but the choice of the
President, which is of small importance to each individual citizen, concerns
the citizens collectively; and however trifling an interest may be, it assumes
a great degree of importance as soon as it becomes general. The President
possesses but few means of rewarding his supporters in comparison to the kings
of Europe, but the places which are at his disposal are sufficiently numerous
to interest, directly or indirectly, several thousand electors in his success.
Political parties in the United States are led to rally round an individual, in
order to acquire a more tangible shape in the eyes of the crowd, and the name
of the candidate for the Presidency is put forward as the symbol and
personification of their theories. For these reasons parties are strongly
interested in gaining the election, not so much with a view to the triumph of
their principles under the auspices of the President-elect as to show by the
majority which returned him, the strength of the supporters of those
principles.
For a long
while before the appointed time is at hand the election becomes the most
important and the all-engrossing topic of discussion. The ardor of faction is
redoubled; and all the artificial passions which the imagination can create in
the bosom of a happy and peaceful land are agitated and brought to light. The
President, on the other hand, is absorbed by the cares of self-defence. He no
longer governs for the interest of the State, but for that of his re-election;
he does homage to the majority, and instead of checking its passions, as his
duty commands him to do, he frequently courts its worst caprices. As the
election draws near, the activity of intrigue and the agitation of the populace
increase; the citizens are divided into hostile camps, each of which assumes
the name of its favorite candidate; the whole nation glows with feverish
excitement; the election is the daily theme of the public papers, the subject
of private conversation, the end of every thought and every action, the sole
interest of the present. As soon as the choice is determined, this ardor is
dispelled; and as a calmer season returns, the current of the State, which had
nearly broken its banks, sinks to its usual level: *a but who can refrain from
astonishment at the causes of the storm.
a [ [Not always. The election of President Lincoln was the signal of civil
war.—Translator's Note.]]
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