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De Omnibus Dubitandum - Lux Veritas

Showing posts with label Electricity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Electricity. Show all posts

Thursday, October 31, 2024

Cuba: The Collapse Accelerates

@ Manhattan Contrarian

Less than three weeks ago, on October 10, I had a post about Cuba with the headline “What The Hell Is Going On In Cuba?” The post noted that it is difficult to get real information from Cuba, and that there had recently been almost total silence about that island from the mainstream media. But if one researched some out-of-the-way sources, it turned out that there is some sort of sudden economic collapse going on there. Besides economic production declining significantly, and pervasive shortages of basic goods, there was also information from a source in Spain (El Pais) that Cuba’s population had suddenly dropped by close to 20% over just the past two to three years. Moreover, the 20% who had departed were not randomly distributed, but rather were concentrated among those in their prime working years, meaning that Cuba had suddenly lost around a third of its working age population.

In the short period since that post, the collapse has accelerated. Just over a week later, on Friday October 18, Cuba’s electrical grid failed, causing a blackout of the entire island. Reuters reported that story on the day of the blackout:

Cuba's national grid collapsed on Friday, leaving the entire population of 10 million people without electricity and underscoring the precarious state of the Communist-run country's infrastructure and economy. Restoration of service is under way but long-term challenges will remain.

But OK, blackouts can happen anywhere. For example, Western North Carolina has just had some extensive blackouts in the aftermath of Hurricane Helene. Is this new Cuba blackout just one of those things caused by a sudden natural event, or does it represent something more systemic in the economy? Clearly, in the case of Cuba it’s the latter.

A few days after the blackout started — Tuesday October 21 — the Cuban authorities began to report that the grid was being rapidly restored. For example, there was this from CBC on October 22:

Cuba made fast progress restoring power to swaths of the Caribbean island nation on Tuesday, both in Havana and outlying provinces. . . . Upwards of 70 per cent of Cuba had electricity on Tuesday, and officials said they expected several more power plants to come online shortly, boosting that total.

That just goes to show why you shouldn’t believe anything coming from Cuban “officials.” The sad truth took a few days to manifest itself. By the middle of the following week, the blackouts were back, and it was becoming clear to anyone who looked that Cuba’s electricity failure was the result of years, indeed decades, of under-investment and under-maintenance. The island’s entire electricity system had fallen into a hole that may well be impossible to dig out of, at least without bringing back capitalism. From the BBC, October 25:

Electricity generation in Cuba has recently fallen well below what’s required, only supplying some 60-70% of the national demand. The shortfall is a “huge and serious gap” which is now being felt across the island, says [Cuban economist Richard] Torres. By the government’s own figures, Cuba’s national electricity generation dropped by around 2.5% in 2023 compared to the previous year, part of a downward trend which has seen a staggering 25% drop in production since 2019.

On October 26, the Guardian reported on how things were going eight days into the blackouts:

A week after the blackout, the island has returned to the status quo ante with regular power cuts of up to 20 hours a day. But the crisis has left a deep, melancholy dread about the future. . . . [On October 18] Antonio Guiteras, one of the main power stations, shut down, crashing all the other big generating stations in the system. “It’s very hard to restart a power station,” said a retired engineer from Antonio Guiteras, who asked to remain anonymous. . . . Antonio Guiteras was built in 1989, and is now battered and obsolete. “The truth is that it was built rotten,” said the engineer. He told harrowing stories of working with faulty safety equipment, political management who would disappear when problems arose and a system long pushed to its limit.

According to a 2023 report from Power magazine, Cuba has a total of eight thermal power plants that are the backbone of its electricity generation system. All but one of those are over 30 years old, and all have been poorly maintained, meaning that they are at or past the end of their useful lives. There are no new thermal plants under construction.

The prospects of bringing the eight old plants suddenly up to top operating condition are about nil. What’s to keep Cuba from just continuing its slide into ever increasing darkness until, at the end, electricity is no more on the island? The communist government thinks it has the answer: Solar! From the Guardian:

In a televised address, Cuba’s prime minister, Manuel Marrero, said . . . the government looks to renewables to secure its future energy needs. The island is blessed by sunshine, but the multiple attempts to start solar projects have nearly all failed when the companies involved failed to get paid. . . . Instead a deal has been cut with a Chinese firm to provide the materials for a slew of solar farms in return for access to Cuba’s nickel deposits.

They’re going to try powering the country with solar panels from China without having any functioning fossil fuel backup for cloudy days or, for that matter, nights. Good luck with that. And then there’s the problem that all the people with relevant expertise have left the country:

[W]ith well over 10% of Cuba’s population having fled the economic crisis on the island in the last two years, there is scepticism whether the expertise remains to build such systems.

The Guardian finishes up by throwing in that it’s not just Cuba’s electricity system that has collapsed; the water system has failed as well:

Meanwhile, one crisis begets another. Failures have been reported in the equally obsolete water supply system. Six hundred thousand people lack regular running water, but the blackouts appear to have multiplied that number by damaging pumps and pipes. Much of Havana is dry.

And on top of it all, they have given up on trying to stop people from leaving. I’d say that the last person out should turn off the lights, but it looks like the lights are already off.

Wednesday, June 22, 2022

The Ripples of Government Intervention

Vincent GelosoVincent GelosoJune 21, 2022 @ American Institute for Economic Research

 

In one of his early works, Ludwig von Mises argued that mixed economies, those that can neither bear the labels of laissez-faire capitalism or socialism, were inherently unstable. His claim was that once a government intervention began, it foiled economic calculation in ways that altered behavior. Once unforeseen consequences of the intervention start revealing themselves, policy-makers must either intervene once more or roll back the policy. In the end, an economy can be free or it can be centrally planned. It cannot be a mixture of both.

This key insight, later extended by Mises himself and refined by scholars such as Sanford Ikeda and Robert Higgs, has become known as the “dynamics of interventionism.” It has become a key element in the literature, emphasizing the necessary conditions for the creation and preservation of a liberal-democratic order (i.e. open political competition combined with a limited state). Simply put, it says that government interventions cause ripples in the economy.

The problem is this body of theory comes up against another, one that is well-accepted in economics: the theory of regulatory capture. While this theory had many early prototypes, its first formal elaboration was produced by George Stigler in the 1970s. It has a deceptively simple point: The creation of regulation itself requires economic calculation. In that view, not only are the regulations desired and understood by economic actors, but the consequences of those regulations are also fully understood. This means that a group asking for a price ceiling is aware that rationing will occur (and that coupons will be issued). The adjustments that people make become permanent and economies need not continue down the path to socialism or be forced to reverse by deregulating. Under that view, there are no ripples.

These views conflict at first glance. In a recent paper with Germain Belzile and Rosolino Candela published in Public Choice, however, we argue that they are actually complementary. The main difference between them is whether the consequences of government interventions have effects that can be fully predicted by regulators. If regulators can predict, then interventions need not debilitate the economy. If not, then unforeseen consequences emerge causing the need for reaction. The ability to predict is largely tied to how bureaucrats and politicians benefit from crafting interventions. As they are not residual claimants to the full profits or losses of their decisions, both are unable (or unincentivized) to access the knowledge necessary to anticipate the long-run consequences of their actions. More importantly, the cost of acquiring knowledge increases the further ahead in time one looks.

The result is that the timing of the unforeseen consequences will vary. Immediate or short-run consequences may well be fully understood, while long-run consequences will not (which begins the process of the dynamics of interventionism).

In the paper, my co-authors and I propose a case study based on the economic history of electricity in Canada. In the early 1900s, the populous province of Ontario began nationalizing its electrical industry. The goal was to provide cheap electricity to manufacturers far-removed from the large city of Toronto and to farmers in rural communities. By 1921, the process was complete. Until the mid-1920s, the government’s policy of providing electricity at below-market prices had the effects understood and desired by politicians, bureaucrats, manufacturers and farmers. They understood that subsidization meant that extra capacity had to be added, and that taxes needed to be raised to finance these additions. What they did not expect, however, was that the demand for electricity was as elastic as it was. The increase in quantity demanded was much greater than expected. Politicians and bureaucrats scrambled for a solution. Rationing was out of the question for political reasons. New generating stations to cover the unexpected surge were too expensive relative to those they had planned. This meant raising taxes, something that was also out of the question for political reasons. The only option left was to build high-voltage transmission lines to the neighboring province of Quebec and import from there.

Quebec, Canada’s second largest province, had a burgeoning (and entirely private) electrical industry, with low costs due to its extensive network of wide and fast-running rivers. Private firms were more than happy to sign contracts for large purchases from the Ontario crown corporation,  as long as they could charge the market price. From 1926 to 1932, the largest utilities in western Quebec (those that bordered Ontario) signed massive provision contracts to the Ontario crown corporation. Between the completion of the first interprovincial high-voltage transmission line in 1928 and 1934, Quebec’s exports of electricity to Ontario went from 4 percent of total output to 19 percent, a sizable increase.

The rub is that the higher demand from Ontario meant higher prices in Quebec markets that were connected to Ontario. My co-authors and I found that the causal effect of being connected to Ontario by high-voltage transmission lines after 1928 was that prices surged from between 13 percent and 21 percent.

These higher prices in Quebec caused a political backlash in the province. Prior to 1928, Quebec had bucked the trend of the rest of North America. Whereas the rest of the subcontinent had been moving toward greater public ownership, most of the few cities in Quebec that had initially opted for public ownership were in the process of privatizing their utilities. After 1928, some cities began to consider greater regulation and outright public ownership. Some large cities reneged on deals they had made with private firms. By 1935, the Quebec Liberal Party (which had been continuously in power since the late 1890s) split in part over the question of nationalizing electrical utilities. In the 1936 election the Liberals opposed nationalization (tepidly at best), and were decimated by the Union Nationale (a merger of the derelict Conservative Party and the liberals who had bolted from the party). The swing against liberal candidates was strongest in constituencies that were connected to Ontario by the high-transmission lines, suggesting that the price increases fueled the nationalization movement. In the late 1930s, extra layers of price regulations were added and, by 1944, the largest electrical utility had been nationalized.

The story here is simple: Nationalization in Ontario from the early 1900s to the 1920s caused regulation and nationalization in Quebec during the 1930s and 1940s. The dynamics of interventionism at play!

No Ontario bureaucrat could have anticipated such a policy development in the neighboring province when nationalization was completed. Yes, they anticipated some of the effects of intervention – the short-run ones. However, the failure to anticipate the long-run consequences meant that some bureaucrats and politicians (not those in Ontario) were forced to add some extra layer of government interventions decades later to deal with the consequences of earlier rounds of intervention.

This example is not banal. It is crucially important. It means that, when someone says “what could go wrong” after proposing a policy intervention, the reply should be “a lot that we will only comprehend many years from now.” The damaging ripples of government intervention may be very far in the future – it does not mean they do not exist.

Vincent Geloso

Vincent Geloso, senior fellow at AIER, is an assistant professor of economics at King’s University College. He obtained a PhD in Economic History from the London School of Economics.

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