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De Omnibus Dubitandum - Lux Veritas

Showing posts with label Joakim Book. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Joakim Book. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 1, 2021

You Cannot Eat Bitcoin

Joakim BookJoakim Book  – May 31, 2021 @ American Institute for Economic Research

As a once-devout environmentalist, I have a T-shirt with a slogan heavily used by activists. Often credited to the Abenaki Alanis Obomsawin, it speaks directly to our modernity-hating followers in the Church of Climate: 

When the last tree is cut, the last fish is caught, and the last river is polluted; when to breathe the air is sickening, you will realize, too late, that wealth is not in bank accounts and that you can’t eat money.

Only a little derogatory we might say: yes, it took monetary economics many centuries of hard work and laborious testing to figure out that we indeed cannot eat money. Though – and this is the Earth-shattering point – we can trade other things for stuff we can eat, and money is a civilizational-changing vehicle for that, as it moves value both across time and place. The political battles over Britain’s Corn Laws in the 1840s featured many debates over what today would be called “food sovereignty,” with the conclusion that crops can better be grown elsewhere – and ever since, Britannia has relied on the rest of the world to feed her, in exchange for the goods (but mostly services) that she provides them. 

The Exchange Rate Risk of Monetary Networks

It is hard to be a consistent fan of Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the author, public intellectual and former trader, as the quality of his written and spoken word fluctuates as much in value as the cryptocurrency he loves to lambast. He has written astonishing books, particularly the ones included in the Incerto series – of which The Black Swan and AntiFragile might be the most well-known. On the negative side, he has said a number of remarkably inane things about the pandemic, and like Elon Musk, he’s also done a one-eighty on bitcoin: from an eager fan and promoter, to a hostile critic.

Mixed bag, in other words. 

In a series of tweets and much-shared comments on social media, Taleb hit both Bitcoin and libertarians, insisting that mutually beneficial trade is of nobody else’s concern (I am unable to find references to them, as Taleb has long since blocked me, but I’m sure the reader is more than capable of finding some stark Taleb-rant on why bitcoin is terrible). He writes that for a person to purchase consumption goods with bitcoin, she must have an income in bitcoin; but for her to receive (parts of) her salary in bitcoin, the employer must receive at least some bitcoin in revenue; and the seller of consumption goods must obtain at least some raw materials in bitcoin. 

Of course, this is terribly wrong; yet, he’s also profoundly right – in an almost trivial way. 

Unless currencies are fixed against one another or redeemable in the same outside money, purchasing and selling items in a currency different from the one in which you pay your expenses or earn your incomes exposes you to exchange rate risk. This is trivial, and obvious to anyone who has ever spent time in another monetary network from their own (or tried to buy/sell something from those monetary networks). If my incomes are in dollars, but my regular expenses are in euros, the exchange rate between euros and dollars changes on a daily (or hourly) basis my real purchasing power. Most international travelers or multinational corporations don’t mind much since these fluctuations are usually quite small, can be insured against via efficient and deep financial markets, and often reverts themselves over time: companies pocket currency windfalls one quarter only to face currency headwinds another. 

In this sense, bitcoin is just another monetary network, with exchange rate risk to incomes or purchases of goods and services in other networks. Much to the ire of bitcoiners and libertarians alike, Taleb has a point: when you opt into any monetary network, you’re not just making an isolated transaction between yourself and whoever sold you the money, but a bet on the future exchange rate of that money vis-à-vis other items. 

Money, long known to monetary economists from Cantillon to Mises, has the strange property that it’s acquired not to be used and consumed, but to be given away later. That means when I give up valuable goods and services – electricity when I mine bitcoin, my time and labor when I work for it, my entries in another monetary network (dollar or euros) when I buy it on an exchange – for a place on the global ledger that is bitcoin, I am not just giving up these resources, but making a gamble on the future state of that network. 

I am acquiring a risk that, firstly, I won’t be able to use the token for something I desire, as the seller of that good or service must also accept my bitcoin; and secondly I don’t know at which exchange rate I will receive that good or service. (This holds even if I just trade it back for dollars later.)

The sneaky comment that underpins Taleb’s entire argument arrives at the end of his rant: for all of us to make transactions in bitcoin – be paid in bitcoin, or be able to pay others in bitcoin – “requires a parity bitcoin-USD of low enough volatility to be tolerable and for variations to remain inconsequential.” The key word is ‘tolerable,’ as every monetary network faces these same issues. As above, travelers to Mexico (pesos) or France (euros), or multinationals purchasing inventory from Brazil (reais) or China (yuan) accept the inherent current risk because they judge the benefits to outweigh those risks. 

Acquiring and holding bitcoin also exposes individuals and companies to exchange rate risks: between what you’re giving up for fiat currency today and what goods and services your future self wants. For the dollar, that risk is usually quite low and ostensibly at least quite predictable: at 2% inflation a year, you know that $100 will get you about $98 worth of goods this time next year and about $96 the next. But, says the monetarily conversant bitcoiner, you don’t actually know that: you’re entrusting that prediction to an increasingly aggressive and increasingly fickle board of Federal Reserve Governors. It also depends on what your future consumption bundle looks like: if you’re looking to buy a computer, cell service, or clothes, you’re probably fine just holding the $100 bill; if your future consumption includes college expenses, medical care, or a house, not so much. 

If we assign high enough probability that these Governors won’t deliver on their promise, and take into account their counterparties in an even more spending-prone Treasury, what a “tolerable” volatility is might be quite a lot. Lots of people who hold bitcoin indeed deem the risk of government mismanagement to be larger than the risk that their bitcoin holdings get them fewer goods and services when they finally convert them into consumption goods.

What’s so ironic here is that the very bitcoiners who detest being pushed into stocks or commodities for long-term monetary savings (the only vehicles left when cash holdings just slowly depreciate), don’t have a problem being pushed into even riskier exchange rate risk down the road. Bitcoin’s exchange rate is unanchored in the sense that we can’t make a decent prediction as to where it’s going to be forty years hence – in contrast to how an NGDP target would or the classical gold standard did. 

Sure enough, objects the still conversant bitcoin theorist, the supply is capped and the demand is infinite, so the price must go to the moon – but what ensures that? You need a very cynical view of government and an inability of creative markets and progress to overcome them for the argument to make sense. And you’re still making the goldbug’s mistake: For decades, goldbugs like Jim Rickards and Peter Schiff have said that gold is immutable and will keep its value, because in a hundred years’ time that gold coin will be exactly the same as it is now. Physically, yes, but not economically. What matters for the holder of gold is what gold gives him in that far-off future. What a risk-averse time-traveling saver is after isn’t something that is physically the same as what he put in, but economically the same – and that’s pretty impossible, as economies, values, and production technologies change. 

When bitcoiners rant against the horrors of forcing people into investment vehicles they are ill-equipped to manage or understand, they miss this fundamental aspect of our monetary economies: price risk and currency exchange risk does not disappear. By introducing a new outside monetary commodity (i.e. without counterparty risk, where your monetary surplus is nobody else’s liability) you ensure that – bar hacks and loss of private keys – the bitcoin saved away today remains the same number of sats when financing future consumption. But you do not ensure that those same number of sats will purchase the retiree the goods and services equal to, or above, the savings.

You cannot eat bitcoin, or dollars, or bank balances, which means that whatever vehicle you use to move value across time has an exchange rate risk. Many bitcoiners’ mistake is to think that their preferred asset avoids this; Taleb’s mistake is to think that others can have a different view of government than him. 

Joakim Book

Joakim Book

Joakim Book is a writer, researcher and editor on all things money, finance and financial history. He holds a masters degree from the University of Oxford and has been a visiting scholar at the American Institute for Economic Research in 2018 and 2019.

His work has been featured in the Financial Times, FT Alphaville, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Svenska Dagbladet, Zero Hedge, The Property Chronicle and many other outlets. He is a regular contributor and co-founder of the Swedish liberty site Cospaia.se, and a frequent writer at CapX, NotesOnLiberty, and HumanProgress.org.

Get notified of new articles from Joakim Book and AIER.

Monday, May 17, 2021

To Lean, Clean, or Reign Supreme

Joakim BookJoakim Book  – May 16, 2021 @ American Institute for Economic Research 

In the early 2000s, before the financial crisis, a debate dominated central banking: whether central bankers should try to reign in financial bubbles in what was called “lean against the wind.” That is, over and above their macroeconomic targets – keeping inflation at or around 2% and ensuring full employment – central banks should also take financial market manias into account. Since spillover from a financial debacle can greatly impact what us economists call the “real” economy (i.e., outside the financial sector), maybe positioning monetary policy accordingly could prevent the crisis altogether – or make the bursting of a bubble less painful. 

When stock market valuations or house prices were high and speculation ran rampant, the story goes, central bankers should lean against that by raising interest rates and making debt-fueled speculation a little more expensive. If done skillfully and with good timing, central banks could prick bubbles before they got out of control, at minimum cost to the real economy. In theory, anyway.  

The debate at the end of what economists call the Great Moderation (a time roughly between the 1980s and 2007 characterized by low inflation, stable unemployment, decent economic growth and only mild recessions), most central banks had landed in the “don’t lean” camp. It’s hard to spot a bubble, it’s costly to the economy to run with above-optimal interest rates, and the few recessions they encountered taught them that “cleaning up” after an implosion – flushing the banking system with liquidity – was cheap and easy. 

The financial crisis of 2007/8 was a painful wakeup call for this established intellectual consensus. The Global Financial Crisis, or GFC, was not easy to clean up; it caused a lot of pain; it was followed by years and years of sluggish growth. Its effects are still with us in terms of home-ownership ratios, government debt, people out of the labor force, and the size of the central bank’s balance sheet. With the eurozone crisis, insolvent governments in Europe’s periphery, and catastrophic economic performance even a decade later, most economists looking at the European Central Bank’s troubles quickly changed their minds. Christian Drescher at the German Bundesbank wrote that however unpleasant and inappropriate it may be to lean, it is “better to lean against the wind than to fight a hurricane.”

Drescher aptly summarized the debate to turn on the following questions: 

  1. Identification/Information: It is far from obvious that anyone can reliably spot asset bubbles, let alone that central bankers can do so better than market participants, to which leaners responded that central banks have private regulatory information and can see the bigger picture; 
  2. Destabilization: by pricking a bubble, you may cause panic, perverse incentives, and other unwanted market behavior. The leaners’ suggested solution was to prick a bubble only at an early stage (but that places even higher information demands on the central banker, as per above); 
  3. Costs: leaning causes “collateral damage” to the rest of the economy for reasons that, even if the central banker is correct (a big if) are going to look dubious to outsiders and policymakers (if you think it’s easy to convince others that your stern actions prevented something that didn’t happen, I have a pink-elephant repellant to sell you). Leaners objected that financial crises are much costlier than that minor damage.   
  4. Effectiveness: central banks have few precision tools at their disposal (shift in the money supply and interest rates hit everywhere in the economy) whereas leaners think they have outsized effects on bubble participants. 

These aren’t trivial problems. While quacks, anticapitalists, and those viewing history in hindsight confidently pronounce that they could spot a collapsing bubble before it happened, the evidence is much less convincing. We can use words and feel uneasy about the quick rise in some asset’s price but words and feelings are poor guides for something as important as an economy-wide monetary policy.

In 2015, even Markus Brunnermeier, a long-time scholar of bubbles, and Isabel Schnabel, then professor of financial economics at the University of Mainz and now on the ECB’s executive board, did not mince words in their extensive survey of historical bubbles and monetary policy: 

“First, bubbles cannot be identified with confidence. A deviation from the fundamental value of an asset could be detected only if the asset’s fundamental value was known.”

Policies that try to identify them and deflate them have “serious impediments,” the scholars conclude. 

What I often found odd in the argument was the hubris to presume that investors, asset managers, or households involved in a bubble would be much swayed by the central bank pushing up the Fed funds rate by a percentage point or two. If leaning works, it works by squeezing the least profitable firms in the economy and liquidating the least solvent and/or convinced investors in the mania. Serious bubbles promise lush and excessive returns in the tens or hundreds of percent – that’s the grand promises that leaning must rein in.

Fast-forward to today, there is an eerie consensus that something is off in financial markets and money more broadly. The GameStop debacle earlier this year was but a preview of what was brewing: retail investors, cheered on by TikTok videos, Reddit forums, and “the boredom hypothesis,” are throwing unfathomable amounts of money around various degrees of hopeful garbage – renewable energy firms, SPACs, dogecoin, colorful options on Robinhood, electric vehicle producers, and every commodity under the sun. Jemima Kelly in the Financial Times concludes that it is “hard to make sense of financial markets in 2021.”

On to the scene we have an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on Monday, by Christian Broda and Stanley Druckenmiller, two well-established investors, resurrecting this never-ending debate over what central banks ought to do:  

“Fed policy has enabled financial-market excesses. Today’s high stock-market valuations, the crypto craze, and the frenzy over special-purpose acquisition companies, or SPACs, are just a few examples of the response to the Fed’s aggressive policies. The central bank should balance rather than fuel asset prices.

The long-term risks from asset bubbles and fiscal dominance dwarf the short-term risk of putting the brakes on a booming economy in 2022.”

After a decade or more of economic and financial events that put central banks under heavy strain – financial collapse, a slow and timid recovery, the pandemic – strange things are again amiss in financial markets.

Broda and Druckenmiller are right to say that “the Fed seems to be fighting the last battle.” Ironically, so are they: we’re back in the lean-or-clean debate of twenty years ago.

Joakim Book

Joakim Book

Joakim Book is a writer, researcher and editor on all things money, finance and financial history. He holds a masters degree from the University of Oxford and has been a visiting scholar at the American Institute for Economic Research in 2018 and 2019.

His work has been featured in the Financial Times, FT Alphaville, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Svenska Dagbladet, Zero Hedge, The Property Chronicle and many other outlets. He is a regular contributor and co-founder of the Swedish liberty site Cospaia.se, and a frequent writer at CapX, NotesOnLiberty, and HumanProgress.org.

Get notified of new articles from Joakim Book and AIER.

 

 

Friday, May 7, 2021

Dissenters, Unite!

Joakim BookJoakim Book  – May 7, 2021 @ American Institute for Economic Research

Being contrarian is hard work. You need to withstand ridicule, the loss of friends, employment, and acquaintances, face the imminent possibility that most of the time you’ll be wrong, and abandon the warm fuzzy feeling of having your otherwise friendly peers confirming your bias. 

Yet, authentic critics are crucially important, even if (and when) they are wrong. When at least some of us speak out against what is the prevailing wisdom on any given topic, we break the numbing spell that majorities have over groups. We temper extremities, flush out the overlooked assumptions in the majoritarian take, and encourage better decision-making. 

Consensus, contrary to the “science is settled” mantra of climate change activists and affectatious Covid pushers alike, is not desirable. At least according to U.C. Berkeley psychologist Charlan Nemeth, who, in her 2018 book In Defense of Troublemakers: The Power of Dissent in Life and Business, summarizes research into majorities and minorities, consensus and dissent. 

It’s not a pretty view for those who think bashing wrong-thinkers into silence and reeducating those with the wrong disposition are the treasured fights of our times. In very accessible chapters, Nemeth takes us through detailed analysis of how the lone dissenter in 12 Angry Men could persuade a powerful majority opting for a guilty verdict (majorities persuade quickly and in numbers; minorities quietly and through persistence); we get a comparison between the JFK administration’s internal information-processing in the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961 and the more balanced and nuanced approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year; we have a brief look at Edward Snowden and the gradual shift of him from a careless criminal to a courageous whistleblower. 

“Repeatedly we find that dissent has value, even when it is wrong, even when we don’t like the dissenter, and even when we are not convinced of his position. Dissent breaks the hold of consensus and majority opinion and enables us to think more independently. Dissent also stimulates thought that is open, divergent, flexible, and original.”

But that’s about it. Nemeth falls for the classic writer’s mistake of telling her readers something rather than showing them. She repeats her talking points about the group value of dissent and she explains the results from various experimental studies, but she never really delves into precisely how those studies convincingly prove the psychological results they aim for: that majorities can pressure us into disbelieving our own senses; that dissenters even in error can improve group decision-making; that consensus can quell creativity and the search for truth. 

The creation myths of the field that is social psychology are that humans are fickle creatures, easily manipulated, and routinely fall prey to group pressures. The “wisdom of crowds” cannot be trusted as they don’t form their opinions independently and so all sorts of incredible behavior are possible, ranging from manias to genocides. There are quirks of our mental processes, believe psychology’s practitioners, that manifest themselves as very odd behavior – that government officials can manipulate for our benefit, or self-help guides can use to improve our lives. 

In the real world outside the experimenter’s carefully assembled settings, this was always much less obvious. Psychology shares the problems of its bastard child with economics (the branch called “behavioral economics”), in that most of its experiments are convoluted and weird. These are not conditions that people usually find themselves in, and most of the time they have no skin in the game, the stakes involved are low, and nobody has a meaningful reason to exert themselves. As Bryan Caplan points out in The Myth of the Rational Voter, people look much less irrational in their natural economic habitat. 

I get the same impression from reading Nemeth. She carefully explains one experiment after another of what seems to be dubious quality: finding anagrams, spotting star constellations, arbitrarily assessing which word associations are creative and original and which are mundane and conventional. She walks us through studies where students were told about a majority of other students’ position on recent campus proposals, which then led them to read a more balanced amount of articles for and against: “They wanted to understand the perspective of that majority,” Nemeth concludes. She manages to show that groups with majority pressure tend to shape both the answers given and the attention awarded various tasks – but how realistic are all these settings? Would they translate to real-world situations we’d be likely to find ourselves in? 

Studies using ultimatum game and dictator game, staples in behavioral economics and social psychology, are often used to point to inherent altruism or that we have an innate aversion against unequal outcomes. When those studies were modified only slightly to resemble real-life conditions (for instance money pots to split were given evenly and not only to the dictator/proposer or research subjects had to work for the money before the game began), the stark results vanished. When observed in real life markets, too, the very same research subjects who had just behaved altruistically in the experimental setting, where they were being observed by the researcher, did not, thinking that they were no longer monitored. 

Even Solomon Asch’s classic conformity experiment (where respondents judge a line to be shorter than it is after hearing their fellow participants take that position) that dominates Nemeth’s first chapter has been gravely criticized, and replications following it show much less of a tendency to conform, if at all. While the conclusions that point to the horrors of peer pressure might have been a quirk of the 1950s, the sample population Asch used, or mere statistical fluke, the result has been firmly entrenched into the wider public: we are fickle creatures that easily conform to what those around us do, even if we know it to be wrong. 

While I want to believe that, and her research would greatly validate my own excessive tendency to – as Steve Carell’s character wonderfully puts it in The Big Short – call B-S on “every f—ing thing,” I don’t think I can. Because of psychology’s replication crisis, where many long-standing research results either turn out to have been faked and manipulated or just don’t hold, it’s hard for non-experts to trust anything coming out of this dismal science. Yet, like Stuart Ritchie or John Ioannidis – and others who’ve done a great service separating out the chaff – often emphasize: the fact that some, or even most, psychology is rubbish doesn’t mean that we can safely discard any new psychology finding without proper cause. All these baskets of bad apples don’t mean that the tree is poisonous. 

Still, many of the experiments that Nemeth walks us through in Troublemakers have the character of many dubious psychology results: incredible outcomes, ambiguous interpretations, settings with little-to-no real-world equivalents. She mentions that her professional work was grounded in studying jury deliberations and verdicts – conditions that are both real and have high stakes – but unfortunately spends almost no time on that work in the book. 

On Joe Rogan’s podcast a few days ago, the comedian Dave Smith spoke passionately against silencing people: “We have to stop trying to shut people up. We have to stop censoring people and banishing people and all of this. We gotta be able to have conversations; we gotta be able to let someone, even if they’re wrong, think out loud.”

This seems like useful advice, regardless of whether Nemeth is right about the powerful impact of dissenters. But I hope she is.

Joakim Book

Joakim Book

Joakim Book is a writer, researcher and editor on all things money, finance and financial history. He holds a masters degree from the University of Oxford and has been a visiting scholar at the American Institute for Economic Research in 2018 and 2019.

His work has been featured in the Financial Times, FT Alphaville, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Svenska Dagbladet, Zero Hedge, The Property Chronicle and many other outlets. He is a regular contributor and co-founder of the Swedish liberty site Cospaia.se, and a frequent writer at CapX, NotesOnLiberty, and HumanProgress.org.

Get notified of new articles from Joakim Book and AIER.

 

Saturday, April 17, 2021

Is Opposing Lockdowns Seditious?

Joakim BookJoakim Book  – April 15, 2021 @ American Institute for Economic Research

 https://www.aier.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/boot-800x508.jpg

The pandemic has revealed and reexposed many fault lines in our societies. On the topic of government power, on lopsided risk assessments, on the religious awakening of secular society, on whether strangers are a source of inspiration and cooperation or a lethal threat, and on science and science communication. 

Many things were broken before we doubled down with heavy government powers on what we may or may not do. The education system, at many levels; climate activists overdoing it, and climate deniers speaking untruths; the woke invasion and its obsession with race and gender; the nativist backlash and its obsession with race and culture; cosmopolitans and immigrants, nationalists and xenophobes. A heavy national debt, a bloated federal government, an activist central bank, health care costs running berserk, overdoses and deaths of despair. You get the picture: plenty of things to disagree about. What matters is that even before the pandemic, many of the disagreements about what we should do about these issues (if anything at all) took on quasi-religious status. 

None of these were helped by taking away the things that most people cherish and live for, our freedoms to move about, or, you know, live our lives as we see fit. We’re paying for it dearly, and will for a long time to come. 

By speaking up against the lockdowns, government overreach, mask mandates, and other topics that become both controversial and inflammatory, AIER made ourselves a target of a certain kind of outrage. All public outlets and individual journalists know the type much too well: Here’s an extract from a fan email we recently received, much too vulgar to print in its entirety,

All Republicans are seditious traitors to America and should be ostracized from polite society. […] I hope you all get the curb stomping and exile that you so desperately deserve. Our country would be better off. Eat s***.

Let’s call our foul-mouthed correspondent Mr. C. – for Combative Calamity, perhaps. I bring up Mr. C only for the surprising lessons about peaceful coexistence and a potential future that his email reveals. 

In even our darkest hour, we may still find some light. 

Solving Unsolvable Disputes

The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche pronounced God dead in the late nineteenth century, a prediction the consequences of which we paid for with millions of lives in the twentieth. Replacing an impeccable God with an impeccable (nation)state has an unfortunate tendency to do that. Beginning in the 2010s, a coddled generation raised under the illusion they were to inherit the Earth in direct proportion to their snow-flakey uniqueness, the misplaced religious tendencies of over a century ago made a shocking comeback. 

When justifying actions towards others on the basis of religious convictions, you place the Almighty himself on one side of the equality – or infinity, or eternal suffering, or more modern cosmic but equally unprovable injustices (climate change, patriarchy, privilege etc). Thus, it doesn’t much matter what values and morals, costs or benefits your opponents may advance on the other side – they are still going to pale in comparison to the infinity you’ve placed on the first side. This is how we get genocides, religious persecutions, tyranny, and other horrific acts of mankind: in pursuit of your single-minded goal, anything and anyone is disposable. 

Fortunately, almost nothing is like that, not even religious teaching itself: Christianity teaches to forgive sinners, not pretending that nobody ever sins. Many past societies, even deeply religious such, were tolerant to outsiders and accepting towards other faiths. Science, properly understood, is most certainly not like that, advancing as it does step-by-step by harsh criticism, objective evidence, debate, and counter-arguments. 

Mr. C.’s letter boils of anger – eloquent and deliberated anger. It’s not a letter written in the heat of the moment – though the content is terrible and disturbing, few writers get his imagery this right on the first try. What strikes me most is how patently displaced the anger is from its source: somewhere in his lockdown-deprived life he projected a massive enemy, identified it in something one of our many great authors wrote, and unleashed the full judgment of the Almighty himself. 

I’m not a social or political historian of the twentieth century, but somehow I don’t believe political leanings were as all-encompassing then as they seem to be now. Friendships end over who sits in the White House; romances are culled if one’s partner is found to deviate from received wisdom; job applications are routinely scrapped if the applicant ever said or did anything now considered controversial; workplaces rebel over what one of their many clients may or may not have say elsewhere; even who makes a wedding cake is important enough a dispute to raise to the Supreme Court, in a cosmic battle over the ideas other people may have in their heads.

When people can no longer stand one another, the zeitgeist that Mr. C. has so profoundly captured (“seditious traitors,” “ostracized”), few options for reconciliation remain. There is no way to negotiate with Mr. C., to establish common ground, or reach a political consensus. There is no more voice, to put the issue in Albert Hirschman’s words, only exit. This I explored in my February piece that called for a century of liberty

“A foundational value at the core of the free society is not only free speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of movement; it is also property rights – which is an extension of the broader principle of leaving people alone. You do you, and I do me. My consumption choices, or the choices I do with regards to the people with whom I surround myself, are not yours to meddle with. The basic idea is ‘to each his own.’”

The most controversial and yet unobjectionable demand that liberty-minded people ever made was to leave others in peace. I can do my thing over here, you can do yours over there, and thus we don’t have to fight over every single thing. If I deeply hate what you believe, and you profoundly loathe what I stand for, isn’t the best thing for both of us – and everyone else in the vicinity – to have us both go our separate ways?

But for totalitarians and others who place the infinite values of the Almighty on one side of the societal struggle, allowing others to live their lives in peace is never an option. In this regard Mr. C. is only an extreme interpretation of what rests dormant in every government official, of every political office-holder: the control over other people’s lives. 

Maybe, just maybe, it’s time for these United States to again become plural – the separate, independent entities they once were. Secession was an option that the Founding Fathers understood well, a feasible avenue to opt out from a tyrannical government that tried to shove certain ideas, rules and behavior down its subjects’ rebellious throats. 

Instead of having the red-shirters and the blue-shirters (or climate activists and deniers, nationalists or open border-types, lockdowners and covidiots) having it out in every aspect of integrated life – in the office, at the supermarket, on the town square, in the football stadium, even over what they voluntarily read on the Internet, and what the woke employees of the tech firms allow others to see – perhaps we can just, you know, leave each other alone…? 

If this makes me a “seditious traitor” too, Mr. C., I’ll wear the accusation as a badge of honor.

Joakim Book

Joakim Book

Joakim Book is a writer, researcher and editor on all things money, finance and financial history. He holds a masters degree from the University of Oxford and has been a visiting scholar at the American Institute for Economic Research in 2018 and 2019.

His work has been featured in the Financial Times, FT Alphaville, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Svenska Dagbladet, Zero Hedge, The Property Chronicle and many other outlets. He is a regular contributor and co-founder of the Swedish liberty site Cospaia.se, and a frequent writer at CapX, NotesOnLiberty, and HumanProgress.org.

Get notified of new articles from Joakim Book and AIER.

 

Saturday, March 27, 2021

MMT’s Inflation Battle Will End In A Draw

Joakim Book Joakim Book  – March 25, 2021

Charles Goodhart, a brilliant banking historian and professor at the London School of Economics, recently said that “I have never seen a theory so criticized, in theory, and actually followed in practice.” He was talking about MMT, Modern Monetary Theory.  

Some of last year’s pandemic measures, and even more so the latest $1.9 trillion deficit-funded package, look suspiciously like an MMT moment: fiscal policy is willing to shower money on anything and everything they like, while everyone else worries about inflation numbers. The Federal Reserve backstops the bond market by buying hundreds of billions worth of bonds every month. Unbelievably large, and largely unprecedented, the Federal government deficit last year (over $3 trillion and on track to rival that this year), has the Treasure wrestling economic control from an otherwise supreme central bank. 

In a recent interview on Bloomberg’s Odd Lots podcast, Stephanie Kelton, one of this fringe economic theory’s foremost proponents, responded to co-host Tracy Alloway’s question about what would make her reconsider the MMT position. The answer: “If all these stimulus packages were passed by Congress and the checks somehow bounced.”

What she means, technically, is that the Treasury General Account (TGA) at the Fed could go as negative as Congress wants it to. If it doesn’t, that is if the Fed doesn’t allow the Treasury an overdraft – let alone an unlimited such – MMT’s supposedly objective description of the world is undermined. 

What’s revealing about this interchange is that it also undermines the narrative of 2020 and 2021 as an MMT moment; we haven’t had the ultimate test of the theory, and the TGA balance tells us so:......To Read More....


Wednesday, March 10, 2021

To Decline or Not Decline: Western Civilization’s Endless Nemesis

Joakim Book Joakim Book  – March 9, 2021@ American Institute for Economic Research

 https://www.aier.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/civilization-800x508.jpg 

The West has died many times, yet remains alive and kicking. In there lies the problem for a whole battery of Western intellectuals up and down its flourishing centuries, who have confidently called for our civilization’s imminent demise. Again and again, writers and philosophers like Henry Adams, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Paul Ehrlich have been proven wrong by reality. 

Somehow, the lessons taken by the next generation of their followers is almost always “this time is different.” Every new prophet of doom – be they racists concerned with nonwhite immigrants or teenagers and politicians of the highest offices worrying about climate change – every new generation of doomsayers speaks the words of failed prophets of the past. 

Pessimism, argues the distinguished scholar Deirdre McCloskey, has been a poor guide to the modern world. This I learned from her work and from the great discipline of economic history, but the point has recently been hammered into me by Arthur Herman’s classic The Idea of Decline in Western History. I must be rather late to the party if I’m reading a book almost as old as myself, but the hopeless events and intimidating government power grabs of last year had many of us flirting with declinist ideas. Most sought refuge in timeless works of the past: Many a nightstand in recent months have seen Shakespeare, Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, Albert Camus’ The Plague, Robert Higgs’ many writings on government’s historical overreach, or Stefan Zweig’s rose-tainted remembrance of the society that World War I destroyed. Mine most certainly. 

In contrast to Herman’s dismal topic and the many prophets of doom explored throughout its dense 450 pages, I took from it a very optimistic message: even though declinist ideologies are appealing, they are often wrong. Still, they get recycled into new messages generation by generation – old wine in new bottles. 

It’s a conservative book, in the original meaning of the word. Not because it pushes or investigates conservative values, but because it illustrates the hopeless failures of social planners wishing to revolutionize what they think is a decadent, flailing, and collapsing society. And how could they not be wrong? Human civilization is complicated, filled with countless unobservable values and motions and motives that no single mind can uncover. The hubris with which intellectuals like Sartre or Adams or Marcuse or Du Bois approach society, believing themselves capable of both investigating and fixing it as if it were a predictable system – like an engineer a broken engine – is monumentally foolish. 

The book is challenging to read and filled with long and intricate explanations of the life work for dozens of Western civilization’s greatest minds. Herman divides the many critics of the West into two camps: cultural pessimists and historical pessimists: 

“The historical pessimist sees civilization’s virtues under attack from malign and destructive forces that it cannot overcome; cultural pessimism claims that those forces form the civilizing process from the start. The historical pessimist worries that his own society is about to destroy itself, the cultural pessimist concludes that it deserves to be destroyed. The historical pessimist sees ‘disaster in the pole star,’ as Henry Adams put it: the cultural pessimist looks forward to disaster, since he believes something better will rise from its ashes.”

“For every Western intellectual who dreads the collapse of his own society,” writes Herman, “there is another who has looked forward to that event with glee.” Some men just want to watch the world burn, Alfred famously taught us. 

What unites all the pessimists and declinists that Herman investigates is their fundamental conviction that their societies were on the brink of collapse, of irremediable disaster. They are so unflinchingly certain that theirs is “a moribund social order” and that only some utopian scheme of the declinist’s own making can save us. We could safely call it “The Jesus syndrome” – single-handedly seeing what’s wrong with their times and with the only remedy in town. It’s strange too that this remedy always involves “a total overthrow of the economic interests and the political institutions” of their time – as if total overthrows usually pan out the way its proponents envision.

Reading about one declinist after another, the famous names of Western intellectual history crisscrossing the pages, I can’t help but wonder if these people ever paused and thought: maybe I’m wrong. Maybe I’m missing something here. Maybe the world is not irrevocably destined for doom…? That humbling thought should be at the back of all of our minds when we can’t make sense of events and ideas in the world. 

If it were that the Marxian stories of the declining world – or the eco-pessimists’, or the racists’, or the fascists’ – had much of a bearing, would they not have played themselves out by now? It’s a well-known irony that the communist revolutions happened not in industrializing Britain but in backward Russia. The more “exploited” and “alienated” the working classes have become, the better their material and physical well-being. Something is clearly wrong in the grand models of the world presented by these varying flavors of doom.

Sprinkled throughout the book are these small commentaries on the grand philosophies he has so eloquently explained. If you don’t pay attention they will pass you by in the otherwise dense prose. By themselves, and by the 21st century standards of Twitter, these are innocent comments – but against the careful and balanced account that usually precedes them, these nuggets of withdrawn ridicule are explosive. About Herbert Marcuse and his Frankfurt School of cultural pessimists he says “a rather farfetched utopia,” before delivering the ultimate ridicule: “a kind of socialist Nintendo arcade.” Another is against Sartre and his reading of the Paris student protests of 1968: 

“The crisis dissipated and the riots ended. The Renault workers called off their strike, the students returned to their classes, and the old ‘doomed’ society again proved its resilience, carrying on as before.”

“In their haste to abandon the West, Sartre and his disciples soon discovered that there was nowhere else to go.” It isn’t, Herman says sardonically about the much-celebrated indigenous societies that the sinful West supplanted, “that the Iroquois or Uruburu cannot build airports or nuclear reactors but that, at a deep level, they have chosen not to do so.”

Occasionally, even our tolerant and diligent guide loses patience with the nutjobs of our intellectual past: “Race history,” he writes commenting on Francis Parker Yockey or Alfred Rosenberg, “has always rejected empirical research in exchange for a mythic vision. The world of verifiable facts becomes unimportant because a deeper vital truth lies underneath.”

From this great book I take away that pessimism and declinist convictions aren’t a left-right divide – indeed, the leftist intellectuals gladly unite in their conclusions with the rightist intellectuals, confidently proclaiming our societies’ doom unless their favored agenda is enacted. 

Western societies’ dividing line doesn’t go between left and right, black and white, or rich and poor, but between those who think demise is around the corner and those seeing humanist progress overcoming its obstacles. “Humanism,” ends Herman, “assumes that since people generate conflicts and problems in society, they can also resolve them, and it concentrates on supplying people with the material, moral, and cultural tools to do so.”

Judging by the many failed prophets of the past, neither are we this time doomed, from climate change or corporate takeovers or from cultural values and demographics deteriorating. That’s an explosively optimistic notion in a world otherwise flirting with madness.

Joakim Book

Joakim Book

Joakim Book is a writer, researcher and editor on all things money, finance and financial history. He holds a masters degree from the University of Oxford and has been a visiting scholar at the American Institute for Economic Research in 2018 and 2019.

His work has been featured in the Financial Times, FT Alphaville, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Svenska Dagbladet, Zero Hedge, The Property Chronicle and many other outlets. He is a regular contributor and co-founder of the Swedish liberty site Cospaia.se, and a frequent writer at CapX, NotesOnLiberty, and HumanProgress.org.

Get notified of new articles from Joakim Book and AIER.

 

Sunday, March 7, 2021

Yuval Noah Harari’s Terrifying Pandemic Future

Joakim Book Joakim Book  – March 3, 2021@ American Institute for Economic Research

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I’m not a big fan of Israeli pop-historian Yuval Noah Harari, the star-spangled author of Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Homo Deus, and most recently 21 Lessons for the 21st Century. His writing is under-analyzed, hyperbolic, ideological, and usually somewhere between trivially true and demonstrably false. 

It is therefore not a surprise that his long-read in the Financial Times last week (‘Lessons from a year of Covid’) didn’t exactly resonate with me. He does however raise what I find to be the most difficult and most engaging question of our times: how groups of humans peacefully coexist. 

Harari spends the first half or so of the essay exploring the many ways that this pandemic differed from those of the past. He does so very well, and in a voice strikingly similar to the progress-oriented optimism with which I often express myself: thanks to productivity and technology and globalization and exposure to plenty of pathogens, our world – or at least the rich part of it – could more easily weather this infectious storm than the societies of our ancestors. Our food-producing machines and transportation chains, run by plenty of machines and very few people, are immune to diseases that spread between humans. This means that we don’t starve. 

Our prosperous economies have allowed us to have lots of clever minds pushing the boundaries of knowledge such that we could quickly assess the virus’ genome or instantly share medical practices that work well. Technological solutions, and the internet in particular, allow many of our everyday routines to continue even during unprecedented quarantines, mitigating the large-scale damaging effects that knocked out pandemic-ridden societies of the past. 

With this I have very little quarrel, and I see it as a historian’s role to bring long-run perspectives to a present otherwise prone to hysteria and hyperbole. Harari is in a good position to advance this view. 

Where Harari strays is in his analysis of the political sphere. Citing places like Australia or Vietnam, he says that “We can beat the virus — but we aren’t sure we are willing to pay the cost of victory. That’s why the scientific achievements have placed an enormous responsibility on the shoulders of politicians.”

He correctly identifies the problem with the “Trust the Scientists” crowd, even though I suspect he’d take their side in the debates over climate change: 

“Science cannot replace politics. When we come to decide on policy, we have to take into account many interests and values, and since there is no scientific way to determine which interests and values are more important, there is no scientific way to decide what we should do.” (emphasis added)

This is precisely right: science can only give us the relevant trade-offs (and often, not even that), but the values of what’s the better outcome are provided by the only entities that assess them: us, individually. 

The myth of democracy is the idealized, indeed romanticized, setting where our individual perspectives, values, goals, and feelings come together to form a coherent entity: the political arena is where astute and incorruptible public servants – representatives of the people – look out for our best interests. They appropriately weigh these interests and values against what The Scientists™ say, aggregating and reflecting what “the” people desire. There is perhaps no scientific way to trade off life against liberty, health risks against prosperity, or poverty reduction against climate change – but there’s a political way. 

For several decades, the public choice revolution of economics has shown this to be false. Voting works poorly; political ignorance is systemic and hopelessly inapt; politicians are far from angels. We get more free trade than we deserve and more regulated economies than we should. Yet, Harari sidesteps the problem by ignoring it. He simply presumes that the problem to be solved – to aggregate and trade off the differing values of large groups of people – can be solved with the magic black box of the political process. 

And then he pulls a complete one-eighty from the initially quite nuanced formulation of how to combine people’s different values and desires: 

“Unfortunately, too many politicians have failed to live up to this responsibility. For example, the populist presidents of the US and Brazil played down the danger, refused to heed experts and peddled conspiracy theories instead. They didn’t come up with a sound federal plan of action and sabotaged attempts by state and municipal authorities to halt the epidemic. The negligence and irresponsibility of the Trump and Bolsonaro administrations have resulted in hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths.”

Somehow, in some select countries, the technocratic experts were undeniably right and the amateurish politicians were wrong not to listen to them – even though there is no way to scientifically trade off a population’s desires. Go figure. 

And so what if the populist right-wing politicians of America and Brazil incompetently underreacted to the pandemic; the populist right-wing politicians of Britain and Australia incompetently overreacted. Is one set of policy mistakes really that much worse than the other?

Without realizing the dissonance from a few paragraphs before – where Harari appropriately described the many unseen costs of the pandemic – he now treats the many “hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths” in Trump’s America and Bolsonaro’s Brazil as a pure loss. But, per his own argument, if there are two mainline policy scenarios and both come with deaths and harms and societal suffering (some direct and some indirect, some seen and some unseen) – how can we speak of them as “preventable?”

Can we really denounce the select politicians we don’t like? At best, it’s an uncomfortable trade-off between who dies and in what ways. And even that’s not clear, as the virus doesn’t seem to have respected the policies that our political overlords enacted against it, undermining the idea that these deaths were in any way “preventable.” 

To round off this impressively poor long-read, Harari recommends that we firstly shore up our digital infrastructure and data (sure, why not), secondly invest more in public health systems – “but politicians and voters sometimes succeed in ignoring the most obvious lesson.” (How that was obvious or somehow followed from his essay is beyond me). And finally, establish a global organ to monitor pathogens: 

“In the age-old war between humans and pathogens, the frontline passes through the body of each and every human being. If this line is breached anywhere on the planet, it puts all of us in danger.” 

Let’s ignore the final call for an expanded WHO with extra powers (military, perhaps?) and the dawning of a world government, and focus instead on the ethical obligation that now runs rampant in our broken societies: everyone’s health is everyone else’s business. Your wants, desires, habits, and routines are mine to police; after all, if we’re not careful, your body could be the source of the next global disease. That means I, or some national or global entity that I control, must be in charge of your life.

It is a scary world into which Professor Harari wants us to happily and voluntarily walk.

Joakim Book

Joakim Book

Joakim Book is a writer, researcher and editor on all things money, finance and financial history. He holds a masters degree from the University of Oxford and has been a visiting scholar at the American Institute for Economic Research in 2018 and 2019.

His work has been featured in the Financial Times, FT Alphaville, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Svenska Dagbladet, Zero Hedge, The Property Chronicle and many other outlets. He is a regular contributor and co-founder of the Swedish liberty site Cospaia.se, and a frequent writer at CapX, NotesOnLiberty, and HumanProgress.org.

Get notified of new articles from Joakim Book and AIER.

Sunday, February 14, 2021

Voting with Your Feet

Joakim Book Joakim Book – February 9, 2021 @ America Institute for Economic Research 

 If Jason Brennan’s Against Democracy met Bryan Caplan’s Open Borders, the result would be Ilya Somin’s great book from last year: Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom. In a dense 186-page book Somin does what these two great scholars did separately over hundreds of pages: undermining voting as the most effectful participation in civic life and showing that arguments against foreigners coming to our shores don’t hold water. The brilliance of Free to Move is to connect these two arguments. Ballot voting is unsatisfactory for all the reasons that foot voting is not: an individual has no ability to impact the outcome of, and therefore has no reason to learn about, the political issues involved. A foot voter has almost full ability to affect the outcome of his or her decisions, and thus all the reasons in the world to investigate them. Having accountable decisions made at the level where their consequences are most urgently felt – the individual – aligns political life with personal values in a way no amount of democratic participation could. 

The story of Somin’s previous book, Democracy and Political Ignorance, is fruitfully weaved into a compelling take on migration. It’s not so much the economic argument that international migration from poor countries to well-off countries enriches the world – which Somin spends some time exploring – but that in doing so people who vote with their feet have a larger say over their own life than they could have by ballot-voting. Individual freedom to live one’s life as one sees fit is thereby advanced; fixing what you think is wrong with your country is more easily done by leaving than by voting. 

In terms of Albert Hirschman’s classic Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Somin makes the case that Exit is a more powerful tool than Voice.  

One thing that often puzzles economists is why people would vote at all considering that you’re more likely to be struck by lightning than to affect the outcome of an election. Most voters can’t distinguish one candidate from another, don’t know what the topics discussed mean, don’t know which party controls which branch of government, and are in no position to assess what the future outcome of proposed policies are likely to be. That doesn’t make for a particularly effective decision-making process and Somin painstakingly takes apart proposals to fix them: the scale and scope of modern government is too large for anyone to grasp in its entirety, making effective and informed voting an impossibility; “retrospective voting” doesn’t work as the electorate would just punish or reward politicians for things they had no influence over. 

Deliberative solutions like Citizens’ Councils just beg the question and make even higher cognitive and informational demands on an otherwise ignorance populace – they also afford too much powers to insiders to set agendas and control information flows: “Here, as elsewhere, increasing the political influence of one part of the population reduces the influence of others.”

Foot-voting lets us escape from the inherent zero-sum nature of politics. If somebody gets more power in a democracy – through franchise exclusions, non-equal voting or more palpably oligarchies and dictatorship – someone else gets less. More people ballot-voting means that my individual voice becomes less important. Not so with foot-voting: for some to hop jurisdictional borders does not “reduce the ability of others to participate in the formation of policy.” 

In the latter half of the book Somin shows that foot voting does a better job than ballot-voting in improving people’s lives, and, more importantly, that the common arguments wielded against (im)migration don’t hold water. We have plenty of problems with ballot-voting, and the worse those problems are the better foot voting looks. As such there’s plenty to annoy ideologues on both the left and the right, which elegantly lets Somin claim the informed and enlightened middle ground – while still advancing a radical idea. 

The private sector angle, briefly touched upon on occasion, is a little weird and under-analyzed. Sure, having private institutions like homeowners’ associations, membership clubs, or private security guards let us opt into rules and policies that we deem most beneficial to us. It lets us take matters into our own hands instead of relying on fickle politicians every other year. But, as Somin freely admits it’s not clear that these are political choices. Then again, plenty of people ballot-vote on narrow personal, financial, or self-identity grounds that aren’t clearly political either. Here Somin effectively takes apart the false dichotomy between economic migrants and refugees (‘political’ migrants): what seems like economic choices are “usually at least in significant part ‘political.’”

The essence of foot voting, like private-sector decisions, is that you decide. In my mind, this selection point is the strongest indication that foot-voting outperforms ballot-voting: with enough ranges of options available for potential movers, they can choose a package that best suits them. An obvious counterargument is that this doesn’t communicate any message; just because Californians are leaving for Texas in the hundreds of thousands, we don’t know why they prefer Texas – and thus, other jurisdictions don’t know which of their own levers to pull to more align themselves with what people want. 

That’s right, but an equally damaging problem in regular ballot-voting. Tons of people voted for Trump, both in 2016 and 2020, but that didn’t tell us what they wanted or why they objected to rival candidates. Communicative voting is very noisy and seriously limited. Foot-voting excels in this respect as it doesn’t require effective communication to work:

“Even if no one else knows why any given set of foot voters acted as they did, they themselves presumably know, and still were able to choose which policies they wish to live under. […] I can enjoy the benefits of [my favored] policies even if no one else knows that was my motivation.”

Leaving people to choose for themselves allows them to opt out of systems that force majoritarian rule on them. Somin makes a great case for migration as a life-changing force for the people able to do it, not least his own parents leaving the Soviet Union. He suggests that of all plausible ways of alleviating suffering and misery, allowing people to vote with their feet might be the best one. If you’re concerned with the morals, practices, and values of the new arrivals so much so that you think they’ll negatively alter the political balance of your state or country, Somin suggests a number of “keyhole solutions” – policies that prevent or address such concerns without barring the foot voters from showing up: directed taxes to make up for perceived costs or delayed and restricted political influence. 

Changing Societies

The simplest and most elegant counterargument against objections to immigration changing the culture of a society comes in the format of a classic “compared to what?” Every generation changes its society but nobody really thinks that’s a big deal (elders complain about the “decadence” of youth?). Even so, Somin kicks in the open door: “Few argue that their elders have a right to use force to prevent [change], much less expel anyone who fails to conform to the previously dominant cultural patterns.”

Here Somin finds a club to repeatedly wield against detractors on both the pro-democracy Left and the anti-immigrant Right. To uphold restrictions on foreign immigrants one must resort to arguments that equally well apply to domestic migrants – policies that nobody favors: 

“Those who accept this type of reasoning [restricting migration because of crime, burdens of welfare state or cultural change] as a justification for immigration restrictions but reject it as a justification for constraints on internal migration have a deep contradiction in their positions, one that in most situations cannot be resolved without applying the same standards to both types of migration.”

A common argument in immigration debates is that a country is like a membership club, a house us insiders own and govern collectively for the benefit of us. Thus, just like I can restrict access to my house to outsiders, a population can restrict access to their country. The problem with the analogy is that the sort of people most likely to invoke it would never allow handing over to the government similar club-based rights of what one can do in their own homes. Libertarians hold government rights tighter than private rights, and so 

“Consistent libertarians should be the last to accept any argument implying that governments should have the same sort of authority over their territory as private property owners have over their houses or clubs.”

Another angle of the same argument is the fear that foreigners don’t share liberal principles. But plenty of natives don’t either and we don’t (yet?) go around expelling them from the country. Besides, writes Somin, “Illiberal natives pose a more serious threat to liberal institutions than recent immigrants do,” as they already have political power. 

“Throughout history,“ Somin concludes, “emigration has been a tremendous boon to people forced to live under corrupt, backward, or oppressive regimes.” Before we restrict their option to leave by closing them out from our societies and economies, Somin concludes, we should ask ourselves three things: first, perhaps the problems we associate with immigration are overstated. Second, we have keyhole solutions available that would address the few problems that may survive such an investigation. Third, migration creates enormous wealth; instead of preventing people from arriving we could tap some of that wealth to offset financial or otherwise perceived harm. 

While not too preachy or moralistic, Somin dispassionately and in a very nuanced way takes apart arguments against his case. Free to Move is an exercise in careful reasoning, not policy prescription, yet Somin still pushes his readers a little further away from relying on ballot voting for improving the world and a little closer to letting foot voting rule. 

However you slice it, voting with your feet is more impactful, more likely to favorably change an outcome, and delivers the goodies to the person who wants them the most. Allowing more and better options for foot-voting doesn’t solve all or even major problems our societies face, but those are topics much outside the scope of Somin’s narrow focus. 

Instead, he delivers a simple and justifiable point: Foot voting isn’t ideal, but it often performs better than the ballot-voting alternative.

Joakim Book

Joakim Book

Joakim Book is a writer, researcher and editor on all things money, finance and financial history. He holds a masters degree from the University of Oxford and has been a visiting scholar at the American Institute for Economic Research in 2018 and 2019.

His work has been featured in the Financial Times, FT Alphaville, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Svenska Dagbladet, Zero Hedge, The Property Chronicle and many other outlets. He is a regular contributor and co-founder of the Swedish liberty site Cospaia.se, and a frequent writer at CapX, NotesOnLiberty, and HumanProgress.org.

Get notified of new articles from Joakim Book and AIER.