By
Peter Zeihan on February 13, 2020
Peter's new book, Disunited Nations, is available for pre-Order now on IndieBound, Apple Books, Hudson Booksellers, Barnes & Noble, Amazon, Google Play, or Kobo.
The Philippine government this week began the formal legal process of
ejecting US forces from the country and ending the US-Philippine
alliance. Chinese involvement in the decision isn’t so much suspected as
assumed. The few pundits who can tear themselves away from the American
primary process are bemoaning another American strategic retreat.
Me? Not so much.
The Philippines is one of those countries I normally have a hard time
getting excited about. As a shattered archipelago it has a damn hard
time holding itself together in anything that the rest of the world
might recognize as a united nation-state. Secessionist struggles define
the country’s modern incarnation, and outside of the major island of
Luzon, the place is a riot of different ethnicities and languages. Add
in rugged, tropical terrain and it will never be a local, much less
regional power.
Which is hardly to say that the place doesn’t matter at all.
The Philippine Archipelago is part of a series of islands that roughly
parallel the coast of the East Asian mainland at about a distance of
1000 miles. Those islands – in addition to the Philippines, they include
the modern states of Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia – are the
most significant factor keeping China from becoming a power of
significance. At no point in the 3500 years of Chinese history have the
Chinese been able to sustainably trade directly with the outside world
without leaning on a foreign partner, be it one of the members of the
island nations surrounding China's coasts, SE Asia or even India.
With a singular exception: Today.
In the aftermath of World War II the Americans crafted the first global
Order, in essence creating a global trade and security network as
compensation for other countries siding with the Americans against the
Soviets. In time this alliance expanded beyond Western Europe and the
Western Hemisphere into East Asia, where it ultimately admitted Japan,
Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia – and with Nixon’s
trip to Beijing – China itself.
For the first time ever, everyone was on the same side, and the
Americans actively prevented Order members from going to war with one
another. This Order is what has enabled the Chinese to escape imperial
predation (most notably by Japan and Europe), access global consumer
markets, and import whatever raw materials – first and foremost energy
supplies – were required in order to fuel their economic integration and
expansion.
All the Americans need to do if the goal is to destroy China as an
economic and political entity, is go home. The Chain’s geography will
take care of the rest.
Enter the Philippines. The place may be a mess, but that mess makes it
the Chain’s weakest link. Should the Chinese succeed in ejecting
American political and military influence from the Philippines, then the
Chinese just might be able to break through into the wider world.
It isn’t quite that simple of course, and not just because an outside
power managing the Philippines is as difficult a task as a local power
ruling it. Gaining round-the-clock secure access for civilian vessels
would require militarizing the Philippines in a manner similar to what
the Japanese and Americans did in the years just before, during and
after World War II. That will generate just as much neoimperial
heartburn for the Chinese as it did for their predecessors.
But the bigger issue is that the Philippines are not quite what China needs.
Again, it is an issue of geography. The Philippines are not at the
Chain’s northern end where they could threaten the Chinese core or serve
as the gateway to North America, nor at the south end where they’d be
on the direct path to China’s core energy sources in the Persian Gulf
and the large markets of Europe. Instead the Philippines are in the
middle, on the path to the wide-open empty of the Central Pacific.
What the Chinese
really need if they are to punch through the
Chain is the Strait of Malacca, the point where Singapore, Malaysia and
Indonesia come together to bracket the world’s busiest trade and energy
chokepoint. Securing Malacca – and let’s be blunt, this means de facto
occupying Singapore
and Malaysia
and Indonesia – would
bring the Chinese 1000 miles closer to their goals, while also
crunching Japanese access to the same. (Although even then, India and
Taiwan remain very much in the way.)
Still, you’ve got to start somewhere.
Don’t look for the United States to fight this.
For one, the American military bases at Hawaii, the Wake and Midway
Islands, complemented by America’s still-firm military relationships
with Japan, Australia and Singapore are more than ample for the
Americans to project power to the Chain and the waters further west.
Most of China’s navy has an operational range of no more than 1000 miles
from their bases, which brings them to – but not through – the Chain.
Anything short of a flat-out occupation of the Philippines in total
won’t change that. Even then it would only be the very first step of a
very long journey.
For two, the Americans are getting out of the global management game, so
reducing their forward positions in East Asia, Europe and the Middle
East is simply inevitable. Getting kicked out isn’t good optics, but as
the Philippines are one of the less valuable bits, it makes sense the
Americans would decamp sooner rather than later.
For three, the American-Philippine relationship has always been a
bit…fraught. The Americans conquered the Philippines in the
Spanish-American War of 1898, something the Philippines are of mixed
minds about. America’s subsequent occupation of the place combined some
of the less savory aspects of later wars in Vietnam and Iraq, making the
Americans of mixed minds. Ongoing American operations against Islamic
secessionists on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao are in
reality one of America’s longest-ever military operations, something the
Americans have long felt was simply the price having a footprint in the
country. Few tears will be shed in America when the GIs come home for
good. If anything, much bubbly will be popped on the hilarious day when
Chinese forces wade into that absurd clusterf**k.
For four, even if the Americans were enthusiastic about staying, the
Philippines have recently taken a political dive that Americans
find…distasteful. Incumbent Philippine President Rodrigo Duarte is a
less competent, less polite, more aggressive, more institutionally
corrosive, more erratic, more violent version of Donald Trump. (Say what
you will about Trump, he’s not actually calling upon his average
supporter to go out and kill anyone he thinks is a problem. So far,
conservatively, president-sponsored vigilante justice is directly
credited for at least 5000 deaths between 2016 and 2018.) No, it isn’t
the Americans you need to look to to counter this.
It’s the Japanese. While the Philippines taken alone are not a big deal,
the archipelago’s flipping would represent the first real change in the
region’s strategic structure since the Japanese defeat in 1945. For the
US this is rather ho-hum, but the Americans don’t live in East Asia.
The Japanese do. Japan’s navy could sail circles around China’s, but it
operates at an extreme numerical disadvantage
and its sail to
strategically vital locales like the Persian Gulf are 2000-3000 miles
further for the Japanese than the Chinese. Losing the Philippines isn’t a
death-blow, but it certainly is a step in the wrong direction –
especially if the Americans get out of the business of doing the
heavy-lifting for Asian security. Expect a flotilla of Japanese
diplomacy, military assistance, tech transfers and outright bribes as
Tokyo attempts to pick up what the Americans are dropping.
Strategic issues aside, there
is one aspect of all this the average American is likely to notice.
When the great outsourcing boom got going in the 1990s, much of the
call-center work that Americans once did shifted to India, a low-wage
country colonized by the Brits. Unfortunately for the Americans, many
are uncomfortable with the mish-mash inflections of South Asian and
British accents that makes up Indian English. But the Philippines had
been a de facto
American colony for a century. English-speakers
in the Philippines sound much closer to the American Midwest than the
rest of the world’s English speakers whose linguistic roots are much
closer to the Brits. In the world of call-centers, the Indians now
handle the rote technical work that is non-customer facing, while the
Philippines are treasured for their people skills. That division of
labor is unlikely to last should Manila go full-Beijing.
You think you hate automated call menus now, just wait for the abject horror to come…