Instability Of The Administration In
The United States
In America the public acts of a community frequently
leave fewer traces than the occurrences of a family—Newspapers the only
historical remains—Instability of the administration prejudicial to the art of
government.
The authority which public men possess in America is so
brief, and they are so soon commingled with the ever-changing population of the
country, that the acts of a community frequently leave fewer traces than the
occurrences of a private family. The public administration is, so to speak,
oral and traditionary. But little is committed to writing, and that little is
wafted away forever, like the leaves of the Sibyl, by the smallest breeze.
The only historical remains in the United States are the
newspapers; but if a number be wanting, the chain of time is broken, and the
present is severed from the past. I am convinced that in fifty years it will be
more difficult to collect authentic documents concerning the social condition
of the Americans at the present day than it is to find remains of the
administration of France during the Middle Ages; and if the United States were
ever invaded by barbarians, it would be necessary to have recourse to the
history of other nations in order to learn anything of the people which now
inhabits them.
The instability of the administration has penetrated into
the habits of the people: it even appears to suit the general taste, and no one
cares for what occurred before his time. No methodical system is pursued; no
archives are formed; and no documents are brought together when it would be
very easy to do so. Where they exist, little store is set upon them; and I have
amongst my papers several original public documents which were given to me in
answer to some of my inquiries. In America society seems to live from hand to
mouth, like an army in the field. Nevertheless, the art of administration may
undoubtedly be ranked as a science, and no sciences can be improved if the
discoveries and observations of successive generations are not connected
together in the order in which they occur. One man, in the short space of his
life remarks a fact; another conceives an idea; the former invents a means of
execution, the latter reduces a truth to a fixed proposition; and mankind
gathers the fruits of individual experience upon its way and gradually forms
the sciences. But the persons who conduct the administration in America can
seldom afford any instruction to each other; and when they assume the direction
of society, they simply possess those attainments which are most widely
disseminated in the community, and no experience peculiar to themselves.
Democracy, carried to its furthest limits, is therefore prejudicial to the art
of government; and for this reason it is better adapted to a people already
versed in the conduct of an administration than to a nation which is
uninitiated in public affairs.
This remark, indeed, is not exclusively applicable to the
science of administration. Although a democratic government is founded upon a
very simple and natural principle, it always presupposes the existence of a
high degree of culture and enlightenment in society. *d At the first glance it
may be imagined to belong to the earliest ages of the world; but maturer
observation will convince us that it could only come last in the succession of
human history.
d [ It is needless to observe that I
speak here of the democratic form of government as applied to a people, not
merely to a tribe.]
Charges Levied By The State Under The Rule Of The
American Democracy
In all communities citizens divisible into three
classes—Habits of each of these classes in the direction of public finances—Why
public expenditure must tend to increase when the people governs—What renders
the extravagance of a democracy less to be feared in America—Public expenditure
under a democracy.
Before we can affirm whether a democratic form of
government is economical or not, we must establish a suitable standard of
comparison. The question would be one of easy solution if we were to attempt to
draw a parallel between a democratic republic and an absolute monarchy. The
public expenditure would be found to be more considerable under the former than
under the latter; such is the case with all free States compared to those which
are not so. It is certain that despotism ruins individuals by preventing them
from producing wealth, much more than by depriving them of the wealth they have
produced; it dries up the source of riches, whilst it usually respects acquired
property. Freedom, on the contrary, engenders far more benefits than it
destroys; and the nations which are favored by free institutions invariably
find that their resources increase even more rapidly than their taxes.
My present object is to compare free nations to each
other, and to point out the influence of democracy upon the finances of a
State.
Communities, as well as organic bodies, are subject to
certain fixed rules in their formation which they cannot evade. They are
composed of certain elements which are common to them at all times and under
all circumstances. The people may always be mentally divided into three
distinct classes. The first of these classes consists of the wealthy; the
second, of those who are in easy circumstances; and the third is composed of
those who have little or no property, and who subsist more especially by the
work which they perform for the two superior orders. The proportion of the
individuals who are included in these three divisions may vary according to the
condition of society, but the divisions themselves can never be obliterated.
It is evident that each of these classes will exercise an
influence peculiar to its own propensities upon the administration of the
finances of the State. If the first of the three exclusively possesses the
legislative power, it is probable that it will not be sparing of the public
funds, because the taxes which are levied on a large fortune only tend to
diminish the sum of superfluous enjoyment, and are, in point of fact, but
little felt. If the second class has the power of making the laws, it will
certainly not be lavish of taxes, because nothing is so onerous as a large
impost which is levied upon a small income. The government of the middle classes
appears to me to be the most economical, though perhaps not the most
enlightened, and certainly not the most generous, of free governments.
But let us now suppose that the legislative authority is
vested in the lowest orders: there are two striking reasons which show that the
tendency of the expenditure will be to increase, not to diminish. As the great
majority of those who create the laws are possessed of no property upon which
taxes can be imposed, all the money which is spent for the community appears to
be spent to their advantage, at no cost of their own; and those who are
possessed of some little property readily find means of regulating the taxes so
that they are burdensome to the wealthy and profitable to the poor, although
the rich are unable to take the same advantage when they are in possession of
the Government.
In countries in which the poor *e should be exclusively
invested with the power of making the laws no great economy of public
expenditure ought to be expected: that expenditure will always be considerable;
either because the taxes do not weigh upon those who levy them, or because they
are levied in such a manner as not to weigh upon those classes. In other words,
the government of the democracy is the only one under which the power which
lays on taxes escapes the payment of them.
e [ The word poor is used here, and
throughout the remainder of this chapter, in a relative, not in an absolute
sense. Poor men in America would often appear rich in comparison with the poor
of Europe; but they may with propriety by styled poor in comparison with their
more affluent countrymen.]
It may be objected (but the argument has no real weight)
that the true interest of the people is indissolubly connected with that of the
wealthier portion of the community, since it cannot but suffer by the severe
measures to which it resorts. But is it not the true interest of kings to
render their subjects happy, and the true interest of nobles to admit recruits
into their order on suitable grounds? If remote advantages had power to prevail
over the passions and the exigencies of the moment, no such thing as a
tyrannical sovereign or an exclusive aristocracy could ever exist.
Again, it may be objected that the poor are never
invested with the sole power of making the laws; but I reply, that wherever
universal suffrage has been established the majority of the community
unquestionably exercises the legislative authority; and if it be proved that
the poor always constitute the majority, it may be added, with perfect truth,
that in the countries in which they possess the elective franchise they possess
the sole power of making laws. But it is certain that in all the nations of the
world the greater number has always consisted of those persons who hold no
property, or of those whose property is insufficient to exempt them from the
necessity of working in order to procure an easy subsistence. Universal
suffrage does therefore, in point of fact, invest the poor with the government
of society.
The disastrous influence which popular authority may
sometimes exercise upon the finances of a State was very clearly seen in some
of the democratic republics of antiquity, in which the public treasure was
exhausted in order to relieve indigent citizens, or to supply the games and theatrical
amusements of the populace. It is true that the representative system was then
very imperfectly known, and that, at the present time, the influence of popular
passion is less felt in the conduct of public affairs; but it may be believed
that the delegate will in the end conform to the principles of his
constituents, and favor their propensities as much as their interests.
The extravagance of democracy is, however, less to be
dreaded in proportion as the people acquires a share of property, because on
the one hand the contributions of the rich are then less needed, and, on the
other, it is more difficult to lay on taxes which do not affect the interests
of the lower classes. On this account universal suffrage would be less
dangerous in France than in England, because in the latter country the property
on which taxes may be levied is vested in fewer hands. America, where the great
majority of the citizens possess some fortune, is in a still more favorable
position than France.
There are still further causes which may increase the sum
of public expenditure in democratic countries. When the aristocracy governs,
the individuals who conduct the affairs of State are exempted by their own
station in society from every kind of privation; they are contented with their
position; power and renown are the objects for which they strive; and, as they
are placed far above the obscurer throng of citizens, they do not always
distinctly perceive how the well-being of the mass of the people ought to
redound to their own honor. They are not indeed callous to the sufferings of
the poor, but they cannot feel those miseries as acutely as if they were
themselves partakers of them. Provided that the people appear to submit to its
lot, the rulers are satisfied, and they demand nothing further from the
Government. An aristocracy is more intent upon the means of maintaining its
influence than upon the means of improving its condition.
When, on the contrary, the people is invested with the
supreme authority, the perpetual sense of their own miseries impels the rulers
of society to seek for perpetual ameliorations. A thousand different objects
are subjected to improvement; the most trivial details are sought out as
susceptible of amendment; and those changes which are accompanied with
considerable expense are more especially advocated, since the object is to
render the condition of the poor more tolerable, who cannot pay for themselves.
Moreover, all democratic communities are agitated by an
ill-defined excitement and by a kind of feverish impatience, that engender a
multitude of innovations, almost all of which are attended with expense.
In monarchies and aristocracies the natural taste which
the rulers have for power and for renown is stimulated by the promptings of
ambition, and they are frequently incited by these temptations to very costly
undertakings. In democracies, where the rulers labor under privations, they can
only be courted by such means as improve their well-being, and these
improvements cannot take place without a sacrifice of money. When a people
begins to reflect upon its situation, it discovers a multitude of wants to
which it had not before been subject, and to satisfy these exigencies recourse
must be had to the coffers of the State. Hence it arises that the public
charges increase in proportion as civilization spreads, and that imposts are
augmented as knowledge pervades the community.
The last cause which frequently renders a democratic
government dearer than any other is, that a democracy does not always succeed
in moderating its expenditure, because it does not understand the art of being
economical. As the designs which it entertains are frequently changed, and the
agents of those designs are still more frequently removed, its undertakings are
often ill conducted or left unfinished: in the former case the State spends
sums out of all proportion to the end which it proposes to accomplish; in the
second, the expense itself is unprofitable. *f
f [ The gross receipts of the Treasury
of the United States in 1832 were about $28,000,000; in 1870 they had risen to
$411,000,000. The gross expenditure in 1832 was $30,000,000; in 1870,
$309,000,000.]
Tendencies Of The American Democracy As Regards The
Salaries Of Public Officers
In the democracies those who establish high salaries have
no chance of profiting by them—Tendency of the American democracy to increase
the salaries of subordinate officers and to lower those of the more important
functionaries—Reason of this—Comparative statement of the salaries of public officers
in the United States and in France.
There is a powerful reason which usually induces
democracies to economize upon the salaries of public officers. As the number of
citizens who dispense the remuneration is extremely large in democratic
countries, so the number of persons who can hope to be benefited by the receipt
of it is comparatively small. In aristocratic countries, on the contrary, the
individuals who fix high salaries have almost always a vague hope of profiting
by them. These appointments may be looked upon as a capital which they create
for their own use, or at least as a resource for their children.
It must, however, be allowed that a democratic State is
most parsimonious towards its principal agents. In America the secondary
officers are much better paid, and the dignitaries of the administration much
worse, than they are elsewhere.
These opposite effects result from the same cause; the
people fixes the salaries of the public officers in both cases; and the scale
of remuneration is determined by the consideration of its own wants. It is held
to be fair that the servants of the public should be placed in the same easy
circumstances as the public itself; *g but when the question turns upon the
salaries of the great officers of State, this rule fails, and chance alone can
guide the popular decision. The poor have no adequate conception of the wants
which the higher classes of society may feel. The sum which is scanty to the rich
appears enormous to the poor man whose wants do not extend beyond the
necessaries of life; and in his estimation the Governor of a State, with his
twelve or fifteen hundred dollars a year, is a very fortunate and enviable
being. *h If you undertake to convince him that the representative of a great
people ought to be able to maintain some show of splendor in the eyes of
foreign nations, he will perhaps assent to your meaning; but when he reflects
on his own humble dwelling, and on the hard-earned produce of his wearisome
toil, he remembers all that he could do with a salary which you say is
insufficient, and he is startled or almost frightened at the sight of such
uncommon wealth. Besides, the secondary public officer is almost on a level
with the people, whilst the others are raised above it. The former may
therefore excite his interest, but the latter begins to arouse his envy.
g [ The easy circumstances in which
secondary functionaries are placed in the United States result also from
another cause, which is independent of the general tendencies of democracy;
every kind of private business is very lucrative, and the State would not be
served at all if it did not pay its servants. The country is in the position of
a commercial undertaking, which is obliged to sustain an expensive competition,
notwithstanding its tastes for economy.]
h [ The State of Ohio, which contains a
million of inhabitants, gives its Governor a salary of only $1,200 a year.]
This is very clearly seen in the United States, where the
salaries seem to decrease as the authority of those who receive them augments
*i
i [ To render this assertion perfectly
evident, it will suffice to examine the scale of salaries of the agents of the
Federal Government. I have added the salaries attached to the corresponding
officers in France under the constitutional monarchy to complete the
comparison.
United States
Treasury
Department
Messenger
............................ $700
Clerk
with lowest salary ............. 1,000
Clerk with highest salary
............ 1,600
Chief
Clerk .......................... 2,000
Secretary
of State ................... 6,000
The
President ........................ 25,000
France
Ministere
des Finances
Hussier
........................... 1,500 fr.
Clerk
with lowest salary, 1,000 to 1,800 fr.
Clerk
with highest salary 3,200 to 8,600 fr.
Secretaire-general
................20,000 fr.
The
Minister ......................80,000
The King ......................12,000,000 fr.
I have perhaps done wrong in selecting
France as my standard of comparison. In France the democratic tendencies of the
nation exercise an ever-increasing influence upon the Government, and the
Chambers show a disposition to raise the low salaries and to lower the
principal ones. Thus, the Minister of Finance, who received 160,000 fr. under
the Empire, receives 80,000 fr. in 1835: the Directeurs-generaux of Finance,
who then received 50,000 fr. now receive only 20,000 fr. [This comparison is
based on the state of things existing in France and the United States in 1831.
It has since materially altered in both countries, but not so much as to impugn
the truth of the author's observation.]]
Under the rule of an aristocracy it frequently happens,
on the contrary, that whilst the high officers are receiving munificent
salaries, the inferior ones have not more than enough to procure the
necessaries of life. The reason of this fact is easily discoverable from causes
very analogous to those to which I have just alluded. If a democracy is unable
to conceive the pleasures of the rich or to witness them without envy, an
aristocracy is slow to understand, or, to speak more correctly, is unacquainted
with, the privations of the poor. The poor man is not (if we use the term
aright) the fellow of the rich one; but he is a being of another species. An
aristocracy is therefore apt to care but little for the fate of its subordinate
agents; and their salaries are only raised when they refuse to perform their
service for too scanty a remuneration.
It is the parsimonious conduct of democracy towards its
principal officers which has countenanced a supposition of far more economical
propensities than any which it really possesses. It is true that it scarcely
allows the means of honorable subsistence to the individuals who conduct its
affairs; but enormous sums are lavished to meet the exigencies or to facilitate
the enjoyments of the people. *j The money raised by taxation may be better
employed, but it is not saved. In general, democracy gives largely to the
community, and very sparingly to those who govern it. The reverse is the case
in aristocratic countries, where the money of the State is expended to the
profit of the persons who are at the head of affairs.
j [ See the American budgets for the
cost of indigent citizens and gratuitous instruction. In 1831 $250,000 were
spent in the State of New York for the maintenance of the poor, and at least
$1,000,000 were devoted to gratuitous instruction. (William's "New York
Annual Register," 1832, pp. 205 and 243.) The State of New York contained
only 1,900,000 inhabitants in the year 1830, which is not more than double the
amount of population in the Department du Nord in France.]
Difficulty of Distinguishing The Causes Which Contribute
To The Economy Of The American Government
We are liable to frequent errors in the research of those
facts which exercise a serious influence upon the fate of mankind, since
nothing is more difficult than to appreciate their real value. One people is
naturally inconsistent and enthusiastic; another is sober and calculating; and
these characteristics originate in their physical constitution or in remote
causes with which we are unacquainted.
These are nations which are fond of parade and the bustle
of festivity, and which do not regret the costly gaieties of an hour. Others,
on the contrary, are attached to more retiring pleasures, and seem almost
ashamed of appearing to be pleased. In some countries the highest value is set
upon the beauty of public edifices; in others the productions of art are
treated with indifference, and everything which is unproductive is looked down
upon with contempt. In some renown, in others money, is the ruling passion.
Independently of the laws, all these causes concur to
exercise a very powerful influence upon the conduct of the finances of the
State. If the Americans never spend the money of the people in galas, it is not
only because the imposition of taxes is under the control of the people, but
because the people takes no delight in public rejoicings. If they repudiate all
ornament from their architecture, and set no store on any but the more
practical and homely advantages, it is not only because they live under democratic
institutions, but because they are a commercial nation. The habits of private
life are continued in public; and we ought carefully to distinguish that
economy which depends upon their institutions from that which is the natural
result of their manners and customs.
Whether The Expenditure Of The United States Can Be
Compared To That Of France
Two points to be established in order to estimate the
extent of the public charges, viz., the national wealth and the rate of
taxation—The wealth and the charges of France not accurately known—Why the
wealth and charges of the Union cannot be accurately known—Researches of the
author with a view to discover the amount of taxation of Pennsylvania—General
symptoms which may serve to indicate the amount of the public charges in a
given nation—Result of this investigation for the Union.
Many attempts have recently been made in France to
compare the public expenditure of that country with the expenditure of the
United States; all these attempts have, however, been unattended by success,
and a few words will suffice to show that they could not have had a
satisfactory result.
In order to estimate the amount of the public charges of
a people two preliminaries are indispensable: it is necessary, in the first
place, to know the wealth of that people; and in the second, to learn what
portion of that wealth is devoted to the expenditure of the State. To show the
amount of taxation without showing the resources which are destined to meet the
demand, is to undertake a futile labor; for it is not the expenditure, but the
relation of the expenditure to the revenue, which it is desirable to know.
The same rate of taxation which may easily be supported
by a wealthy contributor will reduce a poor one to extreme misery. The wealth
of nations is composed of several distinct elements, of which population is the
first, real property the second, and personal property the third. The first of
these three elements may be discovered without difficulty. Amongst civilized
nations it is easy to obtain an accurate census of the inhabitants; but the two
others cannot be determined with so much facility. It is difficult to take an
exact account of all the lands in a country which are under cultivation, with
their natural or their acquired value; and it is still more impossible to
estimate the entire personal property which is at the disposal of a nation, and
which eludes the strictest analysis by the diversity and the number of shapes
under which it may occur. And, indeed, we find that the most ancient civilized
nations of Europe, including even those in which the administration is most
central, have not succeeded, as yet, in determining the exact condition of
their wealth.
In America the attempt has never been made; for how would
such an investigation be possible in a country where society has not yet
settled into habits of regularity and tranquillity; where the national
Government is not assisted by a multiple of agents whose exertions it can
command and direct to one sole end; and where statistics are not studied,
because no one is able to collect the necessary documents, or to find time to
peruse them? Thus the primary elements of the calculations which have been made
in France cannot be obtained in the Union; the relative wealth of the two
countries is unknown; the property of the former is not accurately determined,
and no means exist of computing that of the latter.
I consent, therefore, for the sake of the discussion, to
abandon this necessary term of the comparison, and I confine myself to a computation
of the actual amount of taxation, without investigating the relation which
subsists between the taxation and the revenue. But the reader will perceive
that my task has not been facilitated by the limits which I here lay down for
my researches.
It cannot be doubted that the central administration of
France, assisted by all the public officers who are at its disposal, might
determine with exactitude the amount of the direct and indirect taxes levied
upon the citizens. But this investigation, which no private individual can
undertake, has not hitherto been completed by the French Government, or, at
least, its results have not been made public. We are acquainted with the sum
total of the charges of the State; we know the amount of the departmental expenditure;
but the expenses of the communal divisions have not been computed, and the
amount of the public expenses of France is consequently unknown.
If we now turn to America, we shall perceive that the
difficulties are multiplied and enhanced. The Union publishes an exact return
of the amount of its expenditure; the budgets of the four and twenty States
furnish similar returns of their revenues; but the expenses incident to the
affairs of the counties and the townships are unknown. *k
k [ The Americans, as we have seen,
have four separate budgets, the Union, the States, the Counties, and the
Townships having each severally their own. During my stay in America I made
every endeavor to discover the amount of the public expenditure in the
townships and counties of the principal States of the Union, and I readily
obtained the budget of the larger townships, but I found it quite impossible to
procure that of the smaller ones. I possess, however, some documents relating
to county expenses, which, although incomplete, are still curious. I have to
thank Mr. Richards, Mayor of Philadelphia, for the budgets of thirteen of the
counties of Pennsylvania, viz., Lebanon, Centre, Franklin, Fayette, Montgomery,
Luzerne, Dauphin, Butler, Alleghany, Columbia, Northampton, Northumberland, and
Philadelphia, for the year 1830. Their population at that time consisted of
495,207 inhabitants. On looking at the map of Pennsylvania, it will be seen
that these thirteen counties are scattered in every direction, and so generally
affected by the causes which usually influence the condition of a country, that
they may easily be supposed to furnish a correct average of the financial state
of the counties of Pennsylvania in general; and thus, upon reckoning that the
expenses of these counties amounted in the year 1830 to about $361,650, or
nearly 75 cents for each inhabitant, and calculating that each of them
contributed in the same year about $2.55 towards the Union, and about 75 cents
to the State of Pennsylvania, it appears that they each contributed as their
share of all the public expenses (except those of the townships) the sum of
$4.05. This calculation is doubly incomplete, as it applies only to a single
year and to one part of the public charges; but it has at least the merit of not
being conjectural.]
The authority of the Federal government cannot oblige the
provincial governments to throw any light upon this point; and even if these
governments were inclined to afford their simultaneous co-operation, it may be
doubted whether they possess the means of procuring a satisfactory answer.
Independently of the natural difficulties of the task, the political
organization of the country would act as a hindrance to the success of their
efforts. The county and town magistrates are not appointed by the authorities
of the State, and they are not subjected to their control. It is therefore very
allowable to suppose that, if the State was desirous of obtaining the returns
which we require, its design would be counteracted by the neglect of those subordinate
officers whom it would be obliged to employ. *l It is, in point of fact,
useless to inquire what the Americans might do to forward this inquiry, since
it is certain that they have hitherto done nothing at all. There does not exist
a single individual at the present day, in America or in Europe, who can inform
us what each citizen of the Union annually contributes to the public charges of
the nation. *m [Footnote l: Those who have attempted to draw a comparison
between the expenses of France and America have at once perceived that no such
comparison could be drawn between the total expenditure of the two countries;
but they have endeavored to contrast detached portions of this expenditure. It
may readily be shown that this second system is not at all less defective than
the first. If I attempt to compare the French budget with the budget of the
Union, it must be remembered that the latter embraces much fewer objects than
then central Government of the former country, and that the expenditure must consequently
be much smaller. If I contrast the budgets of the Departments with those of the
States which constitute the Union, it must be observed that, as the power and
control exercised by the States is much greater than that which is exercised by
the Departments, their expenditure is also more considerable. As for the
budgets of the counties, nothing of the kind occurs in the French system of
finances; and it is, again, doubtful whether the corresponding expenses should
be referred to the budget of the State or to those of the municipal divisions.
Municipal expenses exist in both countries, but they are not always analogous.
In America the townships discharge a variety of offices which are reserved in
France to the Departments or to the State. It may, moreover, be asked what is
to be understood by the municipal expenses of America. The organization of the
municipal bodies or townships differs in the several States. Are we to be
guided by what occurs in New England or in Georgia, in Pennsylvania or in the State
of Illinois? A kind of analogy may very readily be perceived between certain
budgets in the two countries; but as the elements of which they are composed
always differ more or less, no fair comparison can be instituted between them.
[The same difficulty exists, perhaps to a greater degree at the present time,
when the taxation of America has largely increased.—1874.]]
m [ Even if we knew the exact pecuniary
contributions of every French and American citizen to the coffers of the State,
we should only come at a portion of the truth. Governments do not only demand
supplies of money, but they call for personal services, which may be looked
upon as equivalent to a given sum. When a State raises an army, besides the pay
of the troops, which is furnished by the entire nation, each soldier must give
up his time, the value of which depends on the use he might make of it if he
were not in the service. The same remark applies to the militia; the citizen
who is in the militia devotes a certain portion of valuable time to the
maintenance of the public peace, and he does in reality surrender to the State
those earnings which he is prevented from gaining. Many other instances might
be cited in addition to these. The governments of France and of America both
levy taxes of this kind, which weigh upon the citizens; but who can estimate
with accuracy their relative amount in the two countries?
This, however, is not the last of the difficulties which
prevent us from comparing the expenditure of the Union with that of France. The
French Government contracts certain obligations which do not exist in America,
and vice versa. The French Government pays the clergy; in America the voluntary
principle prevails. In America there is a legal provision for the poor; in
France they are abandoned to the charity of the public. The French public
officers are paid by a fixed salary; in America they are allowed certain
perquisites. In France contributions in kind take place on very few roads; in
America upon almost all the thoroughfares: in the former country the roads are
free to all travellers; in the latter turnpikes abound. All these differences
in the manner in which contributions are levied in the two countries enhance
the difficulty of comparing their expenditure; for there are certain expenses
which the citizens would not be subject to, or which would at any rate be much
less considerable, if the State did not take upon itself to act in the name of
the public.]
Hence we must conclude that it is no less difficult to
compare the social expenditure than it is to estimate the relative wealth of
France and America. I will even add that it would be dangerous to attempt this
comparison; for when statistics are not based upon computations which are
strictly accurate, they mislead instead of guiding aright. The mind is easily
imposed upon by the false affectation of exactness, which prevails even in the
misstatements of science, and it adopts with confidence errors which are
dressed in the forms of mathematical truth.
We abandon, therefore, our numerical investigation, with
the hope of meeting with data of another kind. In the absence of positive
documents, we may form an opinion as to the proportion which the taxation of a
people bears to its real prosperity, by observing whether its external appearance
is flourishing; whether, after having discharged the calls of the State, the
poor man retains the means of subsistence, and the rich the means of enjoyment;
and whether both classes are contented with their position, seeking, however,
to ameliorate it by perpetual exertions, so that industry is never in want of
capital, nor capital unemployed by industry. The observer who draws his
inferences from these signs will, undoubtedly, be led to the conclusion that
the American of the United States contributes a much smaller portion of his
income to the State than the citizen of France. Nor, indeed, can the result be
otherwise.
A portion of the French debt is the consequence of two
successive invasions; and the Union has no similar calamity to fear. A nation
placed upon the continent of Europe is obliged to maintain a large standing
army; the isolated position of the Union enables it to have only 6,000
soldiers. The French have a fleet of 300 sail; the Americans have 52 vessels.
*n How, then, can the inhabitants of the Union be called upon to contribute as
largely as the inhabitants of France? No parallel can be drawn between the
finances of two countries so differently situated.
n [ See the details in the Budget of
the French Minister of Marine; and for America, the National Calendar of 1833,
p. 228. [But the public debt of the United States in 1870, caused by the Civil
War, amounted to $2,480,672,427; that of France was more than doubled by the
extravagance of the Second Empire and by the war of 1870.]]
It is by examining what actually takes place in the
Union, and not by comparing the Union with France, that we may discover whether
the American Government is really economical. On casting my eyes over the
different republics which form the confederation, I perceive that their
Governments lack perseverance in their undertakings, and that they exercise no
steady control over the men whom they employ. Whence I naturally infer that
they must often spend the money of the people to no purpose, or consume more of
it than is really necessary to their undertakings. Great efforts are made, in
accordance with the democratic origin of society, to satisfy the exigencies of
the lower orders, to open the career of power to their endeavors, and to
diffuse knowledge and comfort amongst them. The poor are maintained, immense
sums are annually devoted to public instruction, all services whatsoever are
remunerated, and the most subordinate agents are liberally paid. If this kind
of government appears to me to be useful and rational, I am nevertheless
constrained to admit that it is expensive.
Wherever the poor direct public affairs and dispose of
the national resources, it appears certain that, as they profit by the
expenditure of the State, they are apt to augment that expenditure.
I conclude, therefore, without having recourse to
inaccurate computations, and without hazarding a comparison which might prove
incorrect, that the democratic government of the Americans is not a cheap
government, as is sometimes asserted; and I have no hesitation in predicting
that, if the people of the United States is ever involved in serious
difficulties, its taxation will speedily be increased to the rate of that which
prevails in the greater part of the aristocracies and the monarchies of Europe.
*o
o [ [That is precisely what has since
occurred.]]
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