Chapter Summary
Natural strength of the majority in democracies—Most of
the American Constitutions have increased this strength by artificial means—How
this has been done—Pledged delegates—Moral power of the majority—Opinion as to
its infallibility—Respect for its rights, how augmented in the United States.
Unlimited Power Of The Majority In The United States, And
Its Consequences
The very essence of democratic government consists in the
absolute sovereignty of the majority; for there is nothing in democratic States
which is capable of resisting it. Most of the American Constitutions have
sought to increase this natural strength of the majority by artificial means.
*a
a [ We observed, in examining the
Federal Constitution, that the efforts of the legislators of the Union had been
diametrically opposed to the present tendency. The consequence has been that
the Federal Government is more independent in its sphere than that of the
States. But the Federal Government scarcely ever interferes in any but external
affairs; and the governments of the State are in the governments of the States
are in reality the authorities which direct society in America.]
The legislature is, of all political institutions, the
one which is most easily swayed by the wishes of the majority. The Americans
determined that the members of the legislature should be elected by the people
immediately, and for a very brief term, in order to subject them, not only to
the general convictions, but even to the daily passion, of their constituents.
The members of both houses are taken from the same class in society, and are
nominated in the same manner; so that the modifications of the legislative
bodies are almost as rapid and quite as irresistible as those of a single
assembly. It is to a legislature thus constituted that almost all the authority
of the government has been entrusted.
But whilst the law increased the strength of those
authorities which of themselves were strong, it enfeebled more and more those
which were naturally weak. It deprived the representatives of the executive of
all stability and independence, and by subjecting them completely to the
caprices of the legislature, it robbed them of the slender influence which the
nature of a democratic government might have allowed them to retain. In several
States the judicial power was also submitted to the elective discretion of the
majority, and in all of them its existence was made to depend on the pleasure
of the legislative authority, since the representatives were empowered annually
to regulate the stipend of the judges.
Custom, however, has done even more than law. A
proceeding which will in the end set all the guarantees of representative
government at naught is becoming more and more general in the United States; it
frequently happens that the electors, who choose a delegate, point out a
certain line of conduct to him, and impose upon him a certain number of
positive obligations which he is pledged to fulfil. With the exception of the
tumult, this comes to the same thing as if the majority of the populace held
its deliberations in the market-place.
Several other circumstances concur in rendering the power
of the majority in America not only preponderant, but irresistible. The moral
authority of the majority is partly based upon the notion that there is more
intelligence and more wisdom in a great number of men collected together than
in a single individual, and that the quantity of legislators is more important
than their quality. The theory of equality is in fact applied to the intellect
of man: and human pride is thus assailed in its last retreat by a doctrine
which the minority hesitate to admit, and in which they very slowly concur.
Like all other powers, and perhaps more than all other powers, the authority of
the many requires the sanction of time; at first it enforces obedience by
constraint, but its laws are not respected until they have long been
maintained.
The right of governing society, which the majority
supposes itself to derive from its superior intelligence, was introduced into
the United States by the first settlers, and this idea, which would be
sufficient of itself to create a free nation, has now been amalgamated with the
manners of the people and the minor incidents of social intercourse.
The French, under the old monarchy, held it for a maxim
(which is still a fundamental principle of the English Constitution) that the
King could do no wrong; and if he did do wrong, the blame was imputed to his
advisers. This notion was highly favorable to habits of obedience, and it
enabled the subject to complain of the law without ceasing to love and honor
the lawgiver. The Americans entertain the same opinion with respect to the
majority.
The moral power of the majority is founded upon yet
another principle, which is, that the interests of the many are to be preferred
to those of the few. It will readily be perceived that the respect here
professed for the rights of the majority must naturally increase or diminish
according to the state of parties. When a nation is divided into several
irreconcilable factions, the privilege of the majority is often overlooked,
because it is intolerable to comply with its demands.
If there existed in America a class of citizens whom the
legislating majority sought to deprive of exclusive privileges which they had
possessed for ages, and to bring down from an elevated station to the level of
the ranks of the multitude, it is probable that the minority would be less
ready to comply with its laws. But as the United States were colonized by men
holding equal rank amongst themselves, there is as yet no natural or permanent
source of dissension between the interests of its different inhabitants.
There are certain communities in which the persons who
constitute the minority can never hope to draw over the majority to their side,
because they must then give up the very point which is at issue between them.
Thus, an aristocracy can never become a majority whilst it retains its
exclusive privileges, and it cannot cede its privileges without ceasing to be
an aristocracy.
In the United States political questions cannot be taken
up in so general and absolute a manner, and all parties are willing to recognize
the right of the majority, because they all hope to turn those rights to their
own advantage at some future time. The majority therefore in that country
exercises a prodigious actual authority, and a moral influence which is
scarcely less preponderant; no obstacles exist which can impede or so much as
retard its progress, or which can induce it to heed the complaints of those
whom it crushes upon its path. This state of things is fatal in itself and
dangerous for the future.
How The Unlimited Power Of The Majority Increases In
America The Instability Of Legislation And Administration Inherent In Democracy
The Americans increase the mutability of the laws which is inherent in
democracy by changing the legislature every year, and by investing it with unbounded
authority—The same effect is produced upon the administration—In America social
amelioration is conducted more energetically but less perseveringly than in
Europe.
I have already spoken of the natural defects of
democratic institutions, and they all of them increase at the exact ratio of
the power of the majority. To begin with the most evident of them all; the
mutability of the laws is an evil inherent in democratic government, because it
is natural to democracies to raise men to power in very rapid succession. But
this evil is more or less sensible in proportion to the authority and the means
of action which the legislature possesses.
In America the authority exercised by the legislative
bodies is supreme; nothing prevents them from accomplishing their wishes with
celerity, and with irresistible power, whilst they are supplied by new
representatives every year. That is to say, the circumstances which contribute
most powerfully to democratic instability, and which admit of the free
application of caprice to every object in the State, are here in full
operation. In conformity with this principle, America is, at the present day,
the country in the world where laws last the shortest time. Almost all the
American constitutions have been amended within the course of thirty years:
there is therefore not a single American State which has not modified the
principles of its legislation in that lapse of time. As for the laws
themselves, a single glance upon the archives of the different States of the
Union suffices to convince one that in America the activity of the legislator
never slackens. Not that the American democracy is naturally less stable than
any other, but that it is allowed to follow its capricious propensities in the
formation of the laws. *b
b [ The legislative acts promulgated by
the State of Massachusetts alone, from the year 1780 to the present time,
already fill three stout volumes; and it must not be forgotten that the
collection to which I allude was published in 1823, when many old laws which
had fallen into disuse were omitted. The State of Massachusetts, which is not
more populous than a department of France, may be considered as the most
stable, the most consistent, and the most sagacious in its undertakings of the
whole Union.]
The omnipotence of the majority, and the rapid as well as
absolute manner in which its decisions are executed in the United States, has
not only the effect of rendering the law unstable, but it exercises the same
influence upon the execution of the law and the conduct of the public
administration. As the majority is the only power which it is important to
court, all its projects are taken up with the greatest ardor, but no sooner is
its attention distracted than all this ardor ceases; whilst in the free States
of Europe the administration is at once independent and secure, so that the
projects of the legislature are put into execution, although its immediate
attention may be directed to other objects.
In America certain ameliorations are undertaken with much
more zeal and activity than elsewhere; in Europe the same ends are promoted by
much less social effort, more continuously applied.
Some years ago several pious individuals undertook to
ameliorate the condition of the prisons. The public was excited by the statements
which they put forward, and the regeneration of criminals became a very popular
undertaking. New prisons were built, and for the first time the idea of
reforming as well as of punishing the delinquent formed a part of prison
discipline. But this happy alteration, in which the public had taken so hearty
an interest, and which the exertions of the citizens had irresistibly
accelerated, could not be completed in a moment. Whilst the new penitentiaries
were being erected (and it was the pleasure of the majority that they should be
terminated with all possible celerity), the old prisons existed, which still
contained a great number of offenders. These jails became more unwholesome and
more corrupt in proportion as the new establishments were beautified and improved,
forming a contrast which may readily be understood. The majority was so eagerly
employed in founding the new prisons that those which already existed were
forgotten; and as the general attention was diverted to a novel object, the
care which had hitherto been bestowed upon the others ceased. The salutary
regulations of discipline were first relaxed, and afterwards broken; so that in
the immediate neighborhood of a prison which bore witness to the mild and
enlightened spirit of our time, dungeons might be met with which reminded the
visitor of the barbarity of the Middle Ages.
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