This is Part II of the latest contribution from Mr. William Kay. His essay is long, well documented, a bit complicated and covers more tie-in subjects than you normally see, so I asked him if I could post the entire essay in installments. He has agreed. I wish to post his essay in this way because I believe it will give everyone more time to dwell on the subject. The story of coal is deep….and not because it is under the ground. You will find this more than interesting, but remember…..”There is no such thing as a conspiracy!” Rich Kozlovich
Coal and the German Energy Revolution
“We have few resources in Germany, two of which are coal and engineering…In a hundred years, we will not have Russian gas or oil. But in a hundred years there is the sun and coal.”
So sayeth model German environmentalist: Frank Asbeck. In 1979 Frank stood shoulder to shoulder with Petra Kelly and Gert Bastion at the creation of the German Greens. He remains a party stalwart.
Today Asbeck drives his Maserati from his castle, through his private hunting grounds, to the Bonn HQ of Solar World. Asbeck is the CEO and main shareholder of this mammoth enterprise. He also owns extensive land holdings and 25% of the Hauck Aufhauser Bank. He’s worth around $500 million.
Asbeck champions renewable energy and “indigenous coal.” He is “a big fan of coal mining in the Ruhr…since I am a patriot.”
So sayeth model German environmentalist: Frank Asbeck. In 1979 Frank stood shoulder to shoulder with Petra Kelly and Gert Bastion at the creation of the German Greens. He remains a party stalwart.
Today Asbeck drives his Maserati from his castle, through his private hunting grounds, to the Bonn HQ of Solar World. Asbeck is the CEO and main shareholder of this mammoth enterprise. He also owns extensive land holdings and 25% of the Hauck Aufhauser Bank. He’s worth around $500 million.
Asbeck champions renewable energy and “indigenous coal.” He is “a big fan of coal mining in the Ruhr…since I am a patriot.”
*
Germany is a small, densely populated country whose only natural energy asset is 40 billion tonnes of brown coal. Copious imports of black coal, petroleum, gas, and uranium strain trade balances. As humanity better harnesses the energy locked in these resources, and as energy grows in economic importance, Germany’s future dims.
Thus, Germany embarked on a survival strategy of subsidies, penalties, and preferences to:
Thus, Germany embarked on a survival strategy of subsidies, penalties, and preferences to:
- deploy renewable energy and fuel-efficient technologies across Germany;
- become proficient in the design and manufacture of these technologies, and;
- market these technologies abroad.
The goals are to reduce fuel imports, increase manufactured goods exports, and undermine the competitive advantage enjoyed by rival countries blessed with abundant energy resources. The Climate Change campaign, while not solely a German affair, is a deliberate deception used by German elites to advance this strategy.
All major German political parties endorse the “Energy Revolution.” All believe “ecological modernization” creates international market opportunities. All believe: “Germany will provide the solutions to global warming.”
The strategy is working. In 2010 renewable energies displaced $6 billion in fuel imports. By 2015 it is hoped “avoided fossil fuel imports” will exceed $20 billion a year. In 2011 green technology exports surpassed $12 billion. Germany produces 30% of the world’s wind turbines.
All major German political parties endorse the “Energy Revolution.” All believe “ecological modernization” creates international market opportunities. All believe: “Germany will provide the solutions to global warming.”
The strategy is working. In 2010 renewable energies displaced $6 billion in fuel imports. By 2015 it is hoped “avoided fossil fuel imports” will exceed $20 billion a year. In 2011 green technology exports surpassed $12 billion. Germany produces 30% of the world’s wind turbines.
*
In the 1970s renewable energy technologies (solar, wind, bio-fuel) were ecotopian fantasies. In the early 1990s experimental renewable projects sprouted. By 2004 Germany’s renewable energy sector employed 160,000 workers. By 2011 it employed 370,000. By 2020 it will employ 500,000.
Between 1990 and 2010 renewables’ share of Germany’s electricity market went from 0% to 18%. Germany’s electricity mix is now: coal 43%, nuclear 21%, natural gas 13%, renewable 18%, and other 5%.
The Energy Revolution’s manifesto is 14 Federal Laws bundled into the “Meseberg Program” in 2007. Meseberg aims to have renewables provide 35% of electricity by 2020 – 66% by 2030. Meseberg presumes public and private investments in renewables of $22 billion per year.
A Meseberg cornerstone, Feed-in-Tariffs for renewable electricity, originated with the Christian Democrat government in 1991. The impetus came from small power producers in Bavaria seeking access to the grid. The 1991 regs forced utilities to feed small producers’ power into the grid.
The Renewable Energy Sources Act, with its compulsory 20-year Feed-in-Tariff contracts, was concocted by the Social Democrat/Green coalition in 2000 but revised several times since. Grid operators must accept electricity from wind farms, solar arrays, and bio-gas plants in preference to the output of nuclear, coal, or gas plants. Grid operators must bear the cost of hooking up renewable generators to the grid. Consumers must pay tariffs, above market prices, to renewable producers. German proselytizing spread this program to 65 jurisdictions around the world.
Meseberg anticipates Germany having 50,000 MW of photovoltaic capacity by 2020. Presently 18,000 MW of photovoltaic capacity provides 2% of German electricity. The 7,400 MW installed in 2010 was 40% of the global photovoltaic market. Italy became the top solar panel buyer in 2011. Germany remains Europe’s biggest solar thermal market.
The solar industry has hit a rough patch. Installation exceeded expectation and the grid is unable accommodate this output. Due to a paring back of subsidies, the industry is a experiencing a shakeout. Rumours of its death are exaggerations.
In 1990 Germany possessed a few experimental wind farms. Now Germany sports 23,000 wind turbines with a capacity of 29,000 MW.
The renewable electricity industry executed a coup in 2011 when, amidst the hysteria ginned up around the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Federal Government announced a nuclear power phase out by 2022. Inscrutably, the post-Fukushima plan envisioned cutting electricity consumption by 10% while increasing Germany’s electric cars fleet from 4,000 to 1,000,000 (this has since been reconsidered).
Between 1990 and 2010 renewables’ share of Germany’s electricity market went from 0% to 18%. Germany’s electricity mix is now: coal 43%, nuclear 21%, natural gas 13%, renewable 18%, and other 5%.
The Energy Revolution’s manifesto is 14 Federal Laws bundled into the “Meseberg Program” in 2007. Meseberg aims to have renewables provide 35% of electricity by 2020 – 66% by 2030. Meseberg presumes public and private investments in renewables of $22 billion per year.
A Meseberg cornerstone, Feed-in-Tariffs for renewable electricity, originated with the Christian Democrat government in 1991. The impetus came from small power producers in Bavaria seeking access to the grid. The 1991 regs forced utilities to feed small producers’ power into the grid.
The Renewable Energy Sources Act, with its compulsory 20-year Feed-in-Tariff contracts, was concocted by the Social Democrat/Green coalition in 2000 but revised several times since. Grid operators must accept electricity from wind farms, solar arrays, and bio-gas plants in preference to the output of nuclear, coal, or gas plants. Grid operators must bear the cost of hooking up renewable generators to the grid. Consumers must pay tariffs, above market prices, to renewable producers. German proselytizing spread this program to 65 jurisdictions around the world.
Meseberg anticipates Germany having 50,000 MW of photovoltaic capacity by 2020. Presently 18,000 MW of photovoltaic capacity provides 2% of German electricity. The 7,400 MW installed in 2010 was 40% of the global photovoltaic market. Italy became the top solar panel buyer in 2011. Germany remains Europe’s biggest solar thermal market.
The solar industry has hit a rough patch. Installation exceeded expectation and the grid is unable accommodate this output. Due to a paring back of subsidies, the industry is a experiencing a shakeout. Rumours of its death are exaggerations.
In 1990 Germany possessed a few experimental wind farms. Now Germany sports 23,000 wind turbines with a capacity of 29,000 MW.
The renewable electricity industry executed a coup in 2011 when, amidst the hysteria ginned up around the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Federal Government announced a nuclear power phase out by 2022. Inscrutably, the post-Fukushima plan envisioned cutting electricity consumption by 10% while increasing Germany’s electric cars fleet from 4,000 to 1,000,000 (this has since been reconsidered).
*
The Energy Revolution benefits landowners, particularly rural ones. The catalysts in the transition to the “low carbon economy” are rural landowners. The Federation of German Farmers is a vociferous advocate of renewable energy.
Less than 0.5% of Germany’s 82 million citizens own an acre. Two-thirds of German households are tenants. (The term “farmer” is elastic, and there are conflicting German stats on the ratio of rented versus owner-occupied farms. Tenant farmers are far more common in Germany than America.)
Rural landowners initiated wind power in the 1990s. By 2000, 75% of Germany’s 6,100 MW of wind power was owned by rural landowners. In 2000, after urban investors entered the market, rural landowners’ share of wind power ownership declined, but they continued to build turbines. Moreover, they rent their land to urban wind investors.
Farmers own 20% of Germany’s photovoltaic panels. Analysts foresee great potential to expand the deployment of solar panels on barn roofs, surplus pastures, etc. Owners of estates, cottages, and large suburban properties are also major solar panel installers.
Germany’s post-2000 bio-fuel boom is entirely rural and heavily state-subsidized.
In 2008 the Federal Government announced a $500 million incentive program for bio-fuels. This was topped up with $700 million for the years 2009 to 2012.
Additional funding for bio-mass and bio-gas projects comes through the Agriculture Investment Support Program, which classifies such expenditures as “coastal environment protection.” The Federal Government provides 60% of funding.
The Agricultural Pension Bank has financed over 1,000 small rural renewable energy projects.
The state bank, KfW, has financed several thousand bio-gas, bio-mass, and co-generation plants.
As well, hundreds of “machine syndicates,” representing thousands of small- and-medium-sized manufacturing and engineering firms involved in renewable energy, counsel farmers on renewable opportunities and organize farmers into purchasing co-ops.
As of 2009 German gasoline stations must sell gasoline blended with 10% ethanol. German farmers supply the feedstock to Germany’s nine ethanol plants, which distill 600,000 tonnes a year. Three-hundred and fifty stations offer an experimental 85% ethanol fuel. Only “flex fuel” cars can burn this fuel. German car companies are feverishly developing such cars.
5,000,000 acres, 17% of German farmland, grow energy crops (canola for bio-diesel; corn and sugar beets for ethanol).
Bio-fuel policies rescued farmers from the “food commodity price roller coaster.” By burning part of their harvest as fuel, farmers can demand higher prices for the remainder they sell as food. Bio-fuels provide a sizable portion of farm income. Farmers are “eco-energy entrepreneurs.”
Germany produces half of Europe’s bio-gas. (Bio-gas is methane derived from manure and silage – commodities hitherto used for fertilizer). Since 2008 bio-gas has been fed into the natural gas pipeline grid. Bio-gas is also used to generate electricity. Bio-gas-fired plant output rose ten-fold over the last decade to 1,600 MW. German Bio-gas Association members own 6,800 methanization plants.
According to the German Bio-mass Research Centre, bio-gas has an annual potential of 12 MTOE (Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent). German annual natural gas consumption is 77 MTOE.
According to the Institute of Applied Ecology, a pan-European bio-gas surge could eliminate the need for Russian gas imports by 2020, thereby saving the EU $40 billion a year.
Ambitious renewable energy schemes flourish in the countryside. Scores of rural municipalities are committed to going 100% renewable. The rural-dominated German Association of Towns and Municipalities supports 100% renewable.
The rural Lander of Schleswig-Holstein boasts 2,700 wind turbines; 1 per 1,000 citizens. Half the electricity consumed in Schleswig-Holstein is from renewables. Schleswig-Holsteiners plan to be 100% renewable by 2020.
Rural politicians extol renewable energy as a local jobs creation program and as a way to keep money circulating in local economies. Renewable energy’s “rural turnover” in Germany in 2010 was $14 billion. Rural politicians dream of freeing their people from the clutches of the Big Four power utilities.
Less than 0.5% of Germany’s 82 million citizens own an acre. Two-thirds of German households are tenants. (The term “farmer” is elastic, and there are conflicting German stats on the ratio of rented versus owner-occupied farms. Tenant farmers are far more common in Germany than America.)
Rural landowners initiated wind power in the 1990s. By 2000, 75% of Germany’s 6,100 MW of wind power was owned by rural landowners. In 2000, after urban investors entered the market, rural landowners’ share of wind power ownership declined, but they continued to build turbines. Moreover, they rent their land to urban wind investors.
Farmers own 20% of Germany’s photovoltaic panels. Analysts foresee great potential to expand the deployment of solar panels on barn roofs, surplus pastures, etc. Owners of estates, cottages, and large suburban properties are also major solar panel installers.
Germany’s post-2000 bio-fuel boom is entirely rural and heavily state-subsidized.
In 2008 the Federal Government announced a $500 million incentive program for bio-fuels. This was topped up with $700 million for the years 2009 to 2012.
Additional funding for bio-mass and bio-gas projects comes through the Agriculture Investment Support Program, which classifies such expenditures as “coastal environment protection.” The Federal Government provides 60% of funding.
The Agricultural Pension Bank has financed over 1,000 small rural renewable energy projects.
The state bank, KfW, has financed several thousand bio-gas, bio-mass, and co-generation plants.
As well, hundreds of “machine syndicates,” representing thousands of small- and-medium-sized manufacturing and engineering firms involved in renewable energy, counsel farmers on renewable opportunities and organize farmers into purchasing co-ops.
As of 2009 German gasoline stations must sell gasoline blended with 10% ethanol. German farmers supply the feedstock to Germany’s nine ethanol plants, which distill 600,000 tonnes a year. Three-hundred and fifty stations offer an experimental 85% ethanol fuel. Only “flex fuel” cars can burn this fuel. German car companies are feverishly developing such cars.
5,000,000 acres, 17% of German farmland, grow energy crops (canola for bio-diesel; corn and sugar beets for ethanol).
Bio-fuel policies rescued farmers from the “food commodity price roller coaster.” By burning part of their harvest as fuel, farmers can demand higher prices for the remainder they sell as food. Bio-fuels provide a sizable portion of farm income. Farmers are “eco-energy entrepreneurs.”
Germany produces half of Europe’s bio-gas. (Bio-gas is methane derived from manure and silage – commodities hitherto used for fertilizer). Since 2008 bio-gas has been fed into the natural gas pipeline grid. Bio-gas is also used to generate electricity. Bio-gas-fired plant output rose ten-fold over the last decade to 1,600 MW. German Bio-gas Association members own 6,800 methanization plants.
According to the German Bio-mass Research Centre, bio-gas has an annual potential of 12 MTOE (Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent). German annual natural gas consumption is 77 MTOE.
According to the Institute of Applied Ecology, a pan-European bio-gas surge could eliminate the need for Russian gas imports by 2020, thereby saving the EU $40 billion a year.
Ambitious renewable energy schemes flourish in the countryside. Scores of rural municipalities are committed to going 100% renewable. The rural-dominated German Association of Towns and Municipalities supports 100% renewable.
The rural Lander of Schleswig-Holstein boasts 2,700 wind turbines; 1 per 1,000 citizens. Half the electricity consumed in Schleswig-Holstein is from renewables. Schleswig-Holsteiners plan to be 100% renewable by 2020.
Rural politicians extol renewable energy as a local jobs creation program and as a way to keep money circulating in local economies. Renewable energy’s “rural turnover” in Germany in 2010 was $14 billion. Rural politicians dream of freeing their people from the clutches of the Big Four power utilities.
*
The Big Four utilities (E.ON, RWE, EnBW, and Vattenfall) have done little to promote renewables. They belatedly embraced renewables and own only 4% of renewable capacity. They are vilified by Greens as enemies of the Energy Revolution.
Most investment in renewables comes from small utilities, rural municipalities, rural landowners, farmers’ co-ops, governments, and government banks such as KfW.
In 2010 Germany’s 375,000 farmers invested $8 billion into their operations. 70% of this went to renewable energy projects.
Germany’s third largest bank, KfW (Reconstruction Credit Institute), was created by Anglo-American occupation forces after WWII. KfW is owned 80% by the Federal Government and 20% by Lander governments. KfW has no retail branches; it deals exclusively with established businesses.
KfW’s motto is “We Promote Germany.”
“Sustainability” is a key facet of KfW’s national and international mission.
In 2011, KfW financed $90 billion worth of projects. One-third of these funds went to “climate and environmental protection.” In 2010 KfW funded $35 billion worth of “climate and environment” projects.
According to the Heinrich Boll Foundation:
“The Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DtA), a public-private bank that merged with KfW in 2003, debt financed roughly 90% of all German wind projects…”
(By 2003 German wind capacity was 14,603 MW.)
In 2009 KfW boasted of financing 54% of German wind power (and 43% of all German renewable energy projects).
To accommodate renewable electricity’s intermittency, governments and heavy industry pour money into research related to mega-batteries, smart meters, and flexible grids.
Heavy industry favours renewable mega-projects like the Desertec Initiative and North Sea Offshore. Such projects lack the mass support base enjoyed by the competing strategy of small projects affixed to private land.
Offshore wind’s future is clouded. Long-term bond restrictions newly decreed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision will make financing offshore wind difficult. Offshore wind projects need long-term bonds. Offshore turbines remain an untested and arguably non-durable technology.
German offshore wind capacity stands at 520 MW with 900 MW under construction. (Gleanings from company press releases provide insights into the inordinate expense of offshore wind: three recently announced projects with a combined capacity of 178 MW had a combined estimated construction cost of $6 billion – over ten times more expensive than coal power.)
Most investment in renewables comes from small utilities, rural municipalities, rural landowners, farmers’ co-ops, governments, and government banks such as KfW.
In 2010 Germany’s 375,000 farmers invested $8 billion into their operations. 70% of this went to renewable energy projects.
Germany’s third largest bank, KfW (Reconstruction Credit Institute), was created by Anglo-American occupation forces after WWII. KfW is owned 80% by the Federal Government and 20% by Lander governments. KfW has no retail branches; it deals exclusively with established businesses.
KfW’s motto is “We Promote Germany.”
“Sustainability” is a key facet of KfW’s national and international mission.
In 2011, KfW financed $90 billion worth of projects. One-third of these funds went to “climate and environmental protection.” In 2010 KfW funded $35 billion worth of “climate and environment” projects.
According to the Heinrich Boll Foundation:
“The Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DtA), a public-private bank that merged with KfW in 2003, debt financed roughly 90% of all German wind projects…”
(By 2003 German wind capacity was 14,603 MW.)
In 2009 KfW boasted of financing 54% of German wind power (and 43% of all German renewable energy projects).
To accommodate renewable electricity’s intermittency, governments and heavy industry pour money into research related to mega-batteries, smart meters, and flexible grids.
Heavy industry favours renewable mega-projects like the Desertec Initiative and North Sea Offshore. Such projects lack the mass support base enjoyed by the competing strategy of small projects affixed to private land.
Offshore wind’s future is clouded. Long-term bond restrictions newly decreed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision will make financing offshore wind difficult. Offshore wind projects need long-term bonds. Offshore turbines remain an untested and arguably non-durable technology.
German offshore wind capacity stands at 520 MW with 900 MW under construction. (Gleanings from company press releases provide insights into the inordinate expense of offshore wind: three recently announced projects with a combined capacity of 178 MW had a combined estimated construction cost of $6 billion – over ten times more expensive than coal power.)
*
Germany’s Energy Revolution is part of a ranging state/corporate strategy involving: recycling, retrofitting buildings, organic foods, green consumer goods, etc. Unifying motives are: reduce imports, increase exports.
Some notable nodules within the eco-industrial complex are:
Some notable nodules within the eco-industrial complex are:
- German Solar Industry Association – an intermediary between Germany’s 800 solar businesses and the Federal Government. The Association was established in 2006 as an alliance of four predecessor solar alliances, the oldest dating to 1979.
- German Energy Agency (DENA, est. 2000) – 50% owned by the Federal Government and 50% owned by a syndicate representing: KfW, Allianz SE, Deutsche Bank, and DZ Bank. DENA uses its $30 million annual budget to run an expertise clearing house for several hundred engineering and financial firms involved in renewable energy.
- German Advisory Council on the Environment – an influential non-partisan state-funded think tank advocating a 100% renewables Germany.
- Econsence – doubles as the German chapter of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. Econsense’s 33 members include: Deutsche Bank, E.ON, Nordbank, Munich Re, Flagsol, Siemens, RWE, and ABB. Econsense was founded in 2000 by the German Federation of Industry “to pool corporate activities on sustainability topics such as climate protection” and “actively shape the political and social discourse.”
- Transatlantic Climate Bridge – established in 2008 by the German Foreign Affairs Ministry to promote climate activism within all levels of Canadian and American governance.
*
Germany’s electrical transformation is part of a social counter-revolution. On one side, wealthy property owners install solar panels and wind turbines. Their electricity bills decline and they pocket tidy profits from the surplus power they feed into the grid. On the other side, average German households’ electricity bills have doubled over the last decade. In 2011 electricity prices rose 10% and 600,000 German households had their power cut off for non-payment. 15% of Germans live in “fuel poverty.”
Similar dynamics characterize Germany’s $4 trillion multi-year program to retrofit buildings with “climate-friendly” energy-saving technology. Much of this mandated expenditure will be done on rented dwellings. Landlords may re-coup all expenses from their tenants.
Similar dynamics characterize Germany’s $4 trillion multi-year program to retrofit buildings with “climate-friendly” energy-saving technology. Much of this mandated expenditure will be done on rented dwellings. Landlords may re-coup all expenses from their tenants.
*
Not only are average German households put out by the Energy Revolution, certain industrial sectors are deeply dissatisfied.
To begin with, renewables were fraudulently advertised. Wind turbines were said to deliver electricity equal to, on average, 30% of their stated “capacity.” However, a recent ten-year German study concluded wind turbines produce, on average, 16% of capacity. Even at their name-plate capacity, wind turbines are far more expensive to build than are coal plants on a cost-per-MW basis. Worse, the inherent intermittency of wind (and solar) power render them incapable of meeting industry needs.
One-fifth of German industry has announced plans to shift production abroad. Among their chief complaints are: electricity costs, carbon permit costs, and disruptions of electricity provision. Steel, aluminum, cement, plastics, and chemical industries are impacted.
Industrial electricity prices in the EU average $180 per MW-hour. In Germany they average $196, and they are due to rise 20% before 2020. Access to cheap reliable electricity was an advantage German industry had over its neighbors; this is gone. Germany was a power exporter; now it is a power importer.
The introduction of renewable electricity to the grid has caused split-second power outages – annoyances to residential power customers but traumas for automated metallurgical plant managers.
Some of GEA’s zinc operations and Aurubis’s copper operations are moving to Asia and South America. Norsk Hydro’s aluminum plant has shut down two production lines. Electricity is 50% of Norsk’s production costs.
Steel giant Thyssen Krupp (TK) expects to shed 5,000 German jobs due to high electricity prices. TK’s electricity bills rose 30% since 2000. TK sold a 450-employee stainless steel mill to a Finnish competitor after the mill’s electricity bill eclipsed 20% of production costs. TK blamed this sale on Berlin’s “irresponsible energy policy.”
To begin with, renewables were fraudulently advertised. Wind turbines were said to deliver electricity equal to, on average, 30% of their stated “capacity.” However, a recent ten-year German study concluded wind turbines produce, on average, 16% of capacity. Even at their name-plate capacity, wind turbines are far more expensive to build than are coal plants on a cost-per-MW basis. Worse, the inherent intermittency of wind (and solar) power render them incapable of meeting industry needs.
One-fifth of German industry has announced plans to shift production abroad. Among their chief complaints are: electricity costs, carbon permit costs, and disruptions of electricity provision. Steel, aluminum, cement, plastics, and chemical industries are impacted.
Industrial electricity prices in the EU average $180 per MW-hour. In Germany they average $196, and they are due to rise 20% before 2020. Access to cheap reliable electricity was an advantage German industry had over its neighbors; this is gone. Germany was a power exporter; now it is a power importer.
The introduction of renewable electricity to the grid has caused split-second power outages – annoyances to residential power customers but traumas for automated metallurgical plant managers.
Some of GEA’s zinc operations and Aurubis’s copper operations are moving to Asia and South America. Norsk Hydro’s aluminum plant has shut down two production lines. Electricity is 50% of Norsk’s production costs.
Steel giant Thyssen Krupp (TK) expects to shed 5,000 German jobs due to high electricity prices. TK’s electricity bills rose 30% since 2000. TK sold a 450-employee stainless steel mill to a Finnish competitor after the mill’s electricity bill eclipsed 20% of production costs. TK blamed this sale on Berlin’s “irresponsible energy policy.”
*
Enviro-skeptics decry “de-industrialization” in apocalyptic terms as though it were national suicide. What eco-fascists have in mind is not de-industrialization back to the Middle Ages but rather a measured industrial downsizing. If 20% of German industry packed up and moved out, the German landed estate would profit. Collapsing labour prices would benefit farmers, the hospitality-tourist sector, and employers of domestic help. Workers would still spend the same amount on rent and food – it is all they will be able to afford. As well, a measured downsizing will diminish the political clout of industry and industrial unions, thereby tightening the landed estate’s lock on state policy processes.
Thus the German state steers between two ditches: a) abandoning basic electricity provision; and b) forsaking the Energy Revolution’s autarkist and aristocratic aims. The solution is to shovel in more German coal.
In August 2012 RWE fired up a 2200 MW coal plant in Cologne, one of 25 coal-fired plants being built across Germany. As a sop to environmentalists, these new coal plants will emit 12% less CO2 than older models due to improved fuel efficiency. None are equipped for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).
German coal consumption rose 5% since the 2011 Fukushima decision. RWE’s coal use is up 20%. RWE and E.ON shun natural gas as being too costly. Deutsche Bank predicts 6,500 MW of German gas power generation will be shuttered by 2015.
Coal’s renaissance is attributed to: a) the nuclear phase out; b) declining coal prices, and; c) collapsing “carbon permit” prices. The latter factor, often deemed the most important, was caused by a glut of permits. EU permit prices fell 43% over the last year to $10 per tonne. European coal plants had profits of $20 per MW-hour in 2012, up from $12 in 2011. Gas plants barely broke even. This occurred despite gas plants needing only half the carbon permits coal plants are required to buy.
In September 2012 a Union Bank of Switzerland spokesman quipped:
“The build-out (of coal plants) has nothing to do with low carbon prices. All these projects were already decided and kicked off several years ago.”
This betrays the existence of a pro-coal strategy planned well in advance of Fukushima and in flagrant disregard of any coherent Climate Change policy.
Of course, not all Germans welcome the coal renaissance.
German environmentalism’s antipathy to coal dates to the 1970s when mysterious reports from Bavaria blamed waldsterben (forest death) on Acid Rain from coal plants. By 1984 99% of Germans knew of Acid Rain and 75% considered it a crisis. Much of the anxiety was directed toward East European coal plants unequipped with the latest desulphurization technology. By the early 1990s the Acid Rain hoax was winding down – and it was a hoax: a comprehensive study conducted by Finland’s forest ministry found no decline in European forests between 1971 and 1990.
Acid Rain dissipated but anti-coal sentiment lingered mainly because coal is the chief rival to renewable power. 95% of Germans pick “renewables” as their favourite electricity source; 3% pick coal.
In 2009 enviro-activists blocked a CCS pilot project designed to dispose of coal emissions. More recently, eco-activists, supported by the SPD-Green government of Schleswig-Holstein, blocked a $3.2 billion coal plant.
Such protestations against coal are either half-hearted posturing or are rooted in the enviro-movement’s margins. The ruling consensus is that the national interest is best served by an electricity system relying primarily on German coal and secondarily on German-built renewables.
Q: How will this combat Global Warming?
A: Global what!?!
Thus the German state steers between two ditches: a) abandoning basic electricity provision; and b) forsaking the Energy Revolution’s autarkist and aristocratic aims. The solution is to shovel in more German coal.
In August 2012 RWE fired up a 2200 MW coal plant in Cologne, one of 25 coal-fired plants being built across Germany. As a sop to environmentalists, these new coal plants will emit 12% less CO2 than older models due to improved fuel efficiency. None are equipped for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).
German coal consumption rose 5% since the 2011 Fukushima decision. RWE’s coal use is up 20%. RWE and E.ON shun natural gas as being too costly. Deutsche Bank predicts 6,500 MW of German gas power generation will be shuttered by 2015.
Coal’s renaissance is attributed to: a) the nuclear phase out; b) declining coal prices, and; c) collapsing “carbon permit” prices. The latter factor, often deemed the most important, was caused by a glut of permits. EU permit prices fell 43% over the last year to $10 per tonne. European coal plants had profits of $20 per MW-hour in 2012, up from $12 in 2011. Gas plants barely broke even. This occurred despite gas plants needing only half the carbon permits coal plants are required to buy.
In September 2012 a Union Bank of Switzerland spokesman quipped:
“The build-out (of coal plants) has nothing to do with low carbon prices. All these projects were already decided and kicked off several years ago.”
This betrays the existence of a pro-coal strategy planned well in advance of Fukushima and in flagrant disregard of any coherent Climate Change policy.
Of course, not all Germans welcome the coal renaissance.
German environmentalism’s antipathy to coal dates to the 1970s when mysterious reports from Bavaria blamed waldsterben (forest death) on Acid Rain from coal plants. By 1984 99% of Germans knew of Acid Rain and 75% considered it a crisis. Much of the anxiety was directed toward East European coal plants unequipped with the latest desulphurization technology. By the early 1990s the Acid Rain hoax was winding down – and it was a hoax: a comprehensive study conducted by Finland’s forest ministry found no decline in European forests between 1971 and 1990.
Acid Rain dissipated but anti-coal sentiment lingered mainly because coal is the chief rival to renewable power. 95% of Germans pick “renewables” as their favourite electricity source; 3% pick coal.
In 2009 enviro-activists blocked a CCS pilot project designed to dispose of coal emissions. More recently, eco-activists, supported by the SPD-Green government of Schleswig-Holstein, blocked a $3.2 billion coal plant.
Such protestations against coal are either half-hearted posturing or are rooted in the enviro-movement’s margins. The ruling consensus is that the national interest is best served by an electricity system relying primarily on German coal and secondarily on German-built renewables.
Q: How will this combat Global Warming?
A: Global what!?!
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