Ever
since the phrase appeared in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, “A rose by any
other name would smell as sweet,” and its variations, have
become familiar expressions. A corollary is that garbage by any other name
would stink just as badly, if not worse.
The
latter phrase seems applicable to the “reform” of the government-sponsored
housing enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac just introduced by Senate Banking
Committee Chairman Tim Johnson (D-S.D.) and Ranking Member Mike Crapo
(R-Idaho). The media often describe this plan as “ending” Fannie and Freddie.
And
yes, it does “end” them in the sense that there will no longer be entities
named Fannie and Freddie. But most of their functions would simply be
transferred to a new giant government entity called the Federal Mortgage
Insurance Corporation. Not only would the government’s role in subsidizing and
micromanaging housing not be reduced, in some ways it would substantially be
increased.
The legislation would create, for the first time, an
explicit taxpayer guarantee of the GSEs’ $5.6 trillion in debt. The “affordable
housing trust fund,” a slush fund for “housing advocacy” groups such as ACORN
with political agendas until it was closed due to Fannie and Freddie’s
financial woes, would be reopened and parked in the new FMIC.
Worst of all, and sending the worst possible signal to
potential private sector investors in the housing market, Fannie and Freddie
common and preferred shareholders would be wiped out permanently under the
bill’s Section 604.
First, let’s recap briefly the
history of the GSEs and their role as the proximate cause of the financial
crisis. Fannie was created as the government agency the Federal National
Mortgage Association in 1938 and spun off as a government-sponsored enterprise
(GSE) in 1968. Freddie was created as a sister GSE two years later.
But even though they had private shareholders, they
always retained government privileges. The president still appointed some of
their board members, they were exempt from state and local taxes, and,
importantly, they each had a lines of credit with the Treasury.
Though these lines were “only” $2 billion, Competitive
Enterprise Institute Founder and then-President (and now Chairman) Fred Smith
warned presciently at a congressional hearing back in 2000 that “as long as the
pipeline is there, it is like it is very expandable. … It could be $200 billion
tomorrow.” (The transcript is here. Fred’s statement, in response to
questioning by Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-N.Y.), appears on page 193.)
It turns out the only flaw in Smith’s prediction was in
fact underestimating the amount taxpayers would spend bailing the entities out
when the Bush administration put them under a conservatorship at the height of
the financial crisis in 2008. While the Obama administration estimates the cost
at $188 billion, a figure often used in the media, the
Congressional Budget Office puts the figure at $317 billion, according to a “fair value”
accounting.
But the GSE’s real cost to taxpayers and the economy came
from Fannie and Freddie’s role in partnering with banks in the creation of
destructive new subprime mortgages as early as the 1990s. As I documented by creating a Fannie-Freddie
“Kevin Bacon Game” based on published reports, “the GSEs had co-starring or at
least supporting roles providing invaluable assistance to bad actors in the
private sector” including Countrywide Financial, Bear Stearns, and Lehman
Brothers.”
As Peter Wallison, senior fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute and a dissenting commissioner on the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission created by Congress, put it last fall in the Wall Street Journal,
in September 2008, “[H]alf of all mortgages in the U.S. — 28 million loans —
were subprime or otherwise risky and low-quality,” and of these, “74% were on
the books of government agencies, principally the GSEs.”
But the Johnson-Crapo “reform” mostly just shifts these books
around. Like an earlier bill drafted by Sens. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) and Mark
Warner (D-Va.), the plan purports to replace Fannie and Freddie with the FMIC,
a government-backed mortgage insurer with political appointees. Much is made on
how, as in Corker-Warner, private investors will take at least 10 perecent of
the first loss on mortgage-backed securities the FMIC insures.
But that still leaves 90 percent of the loss to be
absorbed by the FMIC. As AEI’s Wallison writes, ”When the government backs any
system—whether through deposit insurance, flood insurance, pension benefits or
anything else—the beneficiaries have only limited interest in the risks they
are taking.”
And the biggest beneficiaries may be big-government
housing “advocates” feeding at the trough of the “Housing Trust Fund” the Johnson-Crapo
plan creates within the FMIC that bears a remarkable similarity to that which
used to exist within the GSEs. This “trust fund” was created in another
Fannie-Freddie “reform” bill in 2008 by then-House Financial Services Committee
Chairman Barney Frank at the urging of a “who’s who” of left-wing lobbying
groups.
As I wrote in OpenMarket in 2008, “some of the
biggest “housing advocates” also have politics in their portfolios. These
groups would include the ACORN and the National Council of La Raza, both of
which provide housing counseling as well as lobby for liberal causes and
politicians.”
Fortunately, the “trust fund” laid dormant during the
decent financial management of the GSEs Ed DeMarco. But DeMarco’s replacement,
former Rep. Mel Watt (D-N.C.), who was confirmed in December after Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) went “nuclear” and abolished the filibuster
for nominees, has pledged to restart it. No wonder housing “advocates” applauded so loudly his Watt’s
confirmation. And now, the fact that a bipartisan “reform” plan gives the
“trust fund” its blessing will only strengthen Watt’s hand in bestowing these
goodies.
And amazingly, a “reform” plan so generous at giving
taxpayers’ money to advocacy groups explicitly codifies the Obama
administration’s policy of completely wiping out Fannie and Freddie’s private
shareholders, including community banks, pension funds and middle-class
investors. In August 2012, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner secretly issued the
“Third Amendment” to the GSEs conservatorship in which any profit the GSEs make
would go to the Treasury Department, even after the GSEs paid back what they
owe taxpayers. Section 604 of Johnson-Crapo states that this policy “shall not
be amended, restated, or otherwise changed.”
As noted above, there are different estimates of what
taxpayers are owed, and I would argue that the CBO’s $317 billion figure is
most accurate. But the government can’t claim GSE profits in perpetuity. As Ike
Brannon and Mark Calabria write in a new paper for the Cato Institute, “If
we hope to rebuild our mortgage finance system on a foundation of private
capital, then property and contractual rights must be respected.”
CEI has long believed the best option for the government
to pursue — the only option to be forever rid of the GSEs’ risk to taxpayers
and systemic risk to the economy — is an orderly liquidation of their assets
with no government-backed entity to replace them.
As Fred Smith urged of Congress in 2000 — to mostly deaf
ears — policy makers should “develop a divestiture or breakup plan for Fannie
and Freddie.” And in such a plan, as in traditional bankruptcies, the rights of
both taxpayers and private
investors should be sacrosanct.
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